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Abstract
This dissertation presents three essays on the economics of water manage-
ment in agriculture. The overarching objective of the dissertation is to ex-
plore the effects of institutional setting and biophysical complexity on indi-
vidual decisions around water use as an input. The focus of the dissertation
is on agricultural systems that use groundwater as a source of irrigation.
The first essay is an empirical study of the role of trading ratios and search
frictions in a groundwater market with spatial externalities. Econometric
results suggest that the use of trading ratios can indeed provide incentives
for market participants to reallocate resources in a way that reduces spa-
tial externalities. In the localized informal market I study, search frictions
can be significant, with estimated loss of efficiency of up to 40%. In the
second essay, I develop an analytical framework to explore policy implica-
tions of limitations imposed on groundwater flow rates by underlying aquifer
characteristics. I find that limitations on the instantaneous supply of ground-
water can affect irrigation decisions nonlinearly with a threshold effect. A
profit-maximizing farmer with maximum available water flow rate below the
threshold adjusts irrigation decisions on both the extensive (inter-seasonal)
and intensive (intra-seasonal) margins. Above the threshold, optimally only
intensive margin adjustment occurs. I further explore the role of heterogene-
ity in aquifer characteristics on the effectiveness of different aquifer man-
agement policies for Chase County, Nebraska, using a numerical model. I
ii
find that under conditions of heterogenous instantaneous water availability,
the burden of different policies may fall on different groups of water users
in ways that have not been previously described. This result suggests that
policy makers may need to consider the distributional effects of water man-
agement policies as well as their cost effectiveness. Finally, in the third essay,
I analyze the effects of groundwater depletion on the loss of buffer value of
an aquifer. The chapter develops a framework that captures nonlinearities in
the effect of aquifer levels on the instantaneous supply of groundwater as well
as the intra-seasonal nature of irrigation decisions. Applying the methodol-
ogy to a portion of the High Plains Aquifer, I find that the costs of aquifer
depletion may be greater than previously considered. Specifically, I show
that loss of profit due to the inability to use groundwater to buffer against
intra-seasonal variations of weather can be an order of magnitude higher than
the loss of profit due to increased pumping costs. I also find that changes in
aquifer levels have had quite different effects on buffer values across the area
considered. The results suggest that while, on average, benefits to aquifer
management in a given area may be small, there may be localized regions
with large benefits.
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To the people who provide public goods with no incentives.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Economists often prefer incentive-based policies such as taxes and tradeable
permit markets in regulating activities that create a loss of social surplus. In
practice, these policies are often implemented in settings that are different
from the first-best settings in theoretical applications. For example, trade-
able permit markets may be implemented in local and informal settings. On
the other hand, in many coupled natural-human systems, underlying phys-
ical characteristics affect individual decisions nonlinearly. Uniform policies
designed to reduce resource extraction, however, do not consider these non-
linearities. This dissertation intends to explore the role of limitations im-
posed by institutional settings and underlying physical characteristics on the
effectiveness of natural resource management policies.
The analysis is applied to the management of agricultural systems with
groundwater use. Agricultural production in many parts of the world de-
pends on groundwater aquifers as the primary source of water supply. With
declining aquifer levels, there is increasing demand in understanding the effect
of changing aquifer levels on agricultural production and food security and
the role of existing and proposed management policies in reducing aquifer de-
pletion. However, the interaction between underlying aquifer characteristics
and institutional settings, inter-seasonal and intra-seasonal farmer decisions
and groundwater management policies is poorly understood within the ex-
isting literature. In this dissertation, I intend to bridge this gap by using
theoretical, empirical and numerical analysis to answer specific questions re-
garding the management of groundwater aquifers in agricultural systems.
In Chapter 2, I study the effectiveness of a local and informal tradeable
permit market in reallocating the resources in the presence of search frictions.
Tradeable permit markets are recently emerging as a major policy tool for
reducing environmental externalities such as water pollution and maintaining
the sustainability of natural resources such as groundwater. While more so-
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phisticated permit markets have been studied before, little empirical evidence
exists on the performance of unsophisticated local markets in reallocating the
resources. I consider a groundwater market that was designed to reduce de-
pletion from a surface water body by limiting groundwater extraction from
irrigated agriculture. The market was structured by setting a moratorium on
new acres irrigated by groundwater and allowing transfer of irrigation rights
based on a trading ratio system. While, in theory, trading ratio systems have
been shown to provide incentives to individuals to move the resources in a
direction to reduce non-uniform externalities, it is unclear whether this is
the case in practice. In this chapter, I test whether, in practice, the market
provides incentives to buyers and sellers to move groundwater extraction in
the direction to reduce stream depletion. The results show that the market
under study provides incentives that follow our expectations.
Furthermore, theoretical studies show that tradeable permit markets are
a cost-effective way of reducing environmental externalities and reallocating
resources. However, they have received criticism regarding their performance
due to the presence of transaction costs such as search frictions. While anec-
dotal evidence exists in the presence of search frictions in these markets,
there is no empirical evidence on this front. Using a theoretical framework, I
provide testable hypothesis regarding the presence of search frictions in the
market. I, then, test whether search frictions are significant in an informal
groundwater market with no central market-clearing mechanism to provide
insight into whether the market reallocates the resources cost-effectively. Fi-
nally, I estimate the upper bound of the efficiency loss due to search frictions
to be 39% of the price of a permit. This chapter provides an empirical
analysis using a unique geocoded dataset of trades in the Twin Platte Natu-
ral Resources District groundwater market in Nebraska that includes parcel
specific characteristics. The dataset used in this study provides a significant
advantage compared to previous studies on the presence of transaction costs.
In Chapter 3, I study policy implications of limitations imposed on ground-
water flow rates by underlying aquifer characteristics and aquifer levels.
Groundwater aquifers are complex physical bodies, and their underlying char-
acteristics can affect the ecosystem services they provide. Specifically, phys-
ical aquifer characteristics impose limitations on the rate that a farmer can
extract groundwater during the growing season. Agronomic studies suggest
that groundwater availability during the growing season are critical for crop
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growth and production. Furthermore, they suggest that these limitations of-
ten directly affect farmers’ irrigation decisions. However, existing economics
literature and current policies do not take into account the effect of lim-
ited extraction rates on irrigation decisions of farmers and ignore the daily
nature of irrigation decisions. As a result, these studies provide unrealistic
conclusions regarding the effects of aquifer levels on irrigated agriculture.
In this chapter, I develop an analytical framework to examine the effects
of maximum available groundwater flow rate from an aquifer on a profit
maximizing farmer’s irrigation decisions about the number of irrigated acres
and expected groundwater application per acre. The analytical results show
that groundwater flow rate plays a fundamental role in farmers’ irrigation
decisions through its effect on potential crop yield. Specifically, I find that
maximum flow rate affects irrigation decisions nonlinearly with a threshold
effect. Profit-maximizing farmers with maximum flow rates below the switch-
ing point adjust their number of irrigated acres to be able to meet crop water
demand during the critical stages of the growing season on the irrigated acres.
This adjustment of irrigated acres can result in significant loss of profit.
Underlying aquifer characteristics are often heterogeneous across parcels,
even at small scales such as counties. As a result, instantaneous groundwater
supply significantly varies across parcels, resulting in differential irrigation
decisions among individual farmers. This spatial heterogeneity and its ef-
fect on irrigation decisions can have significant implication for the choice of
aquifer management policies. I build on the analytical results and develop a
numerical model to study the cost-effectiveness and distributional effects of
different policies for reducing aquifer depletion within irrigated agriculture
in Chase County, Nebraska. The results show that the cost-effective policy
may not be the best policy when local aquifer depletion is of concern. This
surprising result occurs because the cost-effective policy, the pumping tax,
provides larger incentives for farmers with greater well capacities, while an
acreage tax can provide incentives to farmers with lower well capacities to
reduce their extraction.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I estimate the loss of buffer value of an aquifer as
a result of depletion of the resource. Groundwater aquifers provide a reli-
able source of water supply for irrigated agriculture that enables farmers to
buffer against weather variations. However, as a result of aquifer depletion,
the maximum flow rate that one can extract groundwater from an aquifer
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decreases nonlinearly. This nonlinearity combined with nonlinear effects of
maximum flow rate on irrigation decisions and profit can result in signifi-
cant loss of buffer value due to aquifer depletion. In this chapter, using the
theoretical model developed in chapter 3, I introduce a framework to study
the changes in buffer value of an aquifer due to aquifer depletion taking into
account the interaction between aquifer characteristics and intra-seasonal na-
ture of irrigation decisions. I, then, apply the methodology to a part of the
High Plains aquifer which includes five counties in Nebraska and Kansas to
estimate the loss of buffer value between 1980 and 2009. This chapter has
several major findings. First, I find that costs of aquifer depletion can be
greater than previously considered. Specifically, I show that loss of profit
due to inability to buffer against intra-seasonal variations of weather can
be an order of magnitude higher than the loss of profit due to increasing
pumping costs. Second, I find that changes in aquifer levels have had signif-
icantly different effects on the buffer value of aquifer across the region even
within local areas. Many existing studies that focus on the value of aquifer
management find relatively small benefits to management. The findings in
this chapter suggest that while the average effects on the entire management
area may be small, there can be significant benefits to aquifer management
within parts of a management area. Finally, the findings show that changes
in buffer value do not entirely correlate with changes in aquifer levels. This
is because other factors affect the changes in buffer value of aquifers such as
initial aquifer levels and heterogeneity in aquifer characteristics. This finding
suggests that merely focusing on changes in aquifer levels does not provide
the full picture and may result in providing misleading policy recommenda-
tions. The approach presented in this chapter captures realistic biophysical
relationships and their effect on irrigation decisions and provides an outcome
that is relevant in introducing policies.
While all the chapters of this dissertation have focused on the manage-
ment of groundwater resources in agricultural production, the questions and
results in this dissertation have more general implications. In many of the
existing and emerging problems within the context of environmental and
resource economics, we can observe similar physical and institutional limita-
tions that affect individuals’ decisions. Tradeable permit markets are being
used widely to manage externalities and control the extraction of natural
resources while, in cases such as fisheries, the size of the stock could have a
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nonlinear effect on optimal vessel size, effort and the number of quotas held.
Finally, the interaction of underlying physical and institutional characteris-
tics and individuals response can affect the effectiveness of different policies
in many similar cases.
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CHAPTER 2
IMPLICATIONS OF SEARCH FRICTIONS
FOR TRADEABLE PERMIT MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
With increased stress on groundwater aquifers due to increasing demand
and changing climatic conditions, and with our improved understanding of
surface water and groundwater interactions, the popularity of groundwater
markets is growing among policymakers (Aladjem and Sunding, 2015). How-
ever, little empirical evidence exists on their performance in reallocating the
resource. In this chapter, I study the performance of a groundwater market
that was designed to reduce depletion from a surface water body by limiting
groundwater pumping from irrigated agriculture and allowing trades among
participants. I address two questions regarding the performance of the mar-
ket. First, does the market provide incentives to move the resources in a
direction to reduce stream depletion in practice? Second, are search frictions
significant in this market? I estimate an upper bound for search costs in the
market to gain insight into whether resource reallocation is cost-effective.
Several studies exist on the design and cost-effectiveness of spatially ex-
plicit environmental management policies. Most of these studies focus on
the design of pollution permit systems (Montgomery, 1972; Hung and Shaw,
2005). Kuwayama and Brozovic´ (2013) analyzed cost saving from adopting a
spatially explicit permit system for groundwater pumping to reduce stream
depletion. They show that at the optimal allocation, the price of a permit
(for pumping one unit of groundwater) will be relative to a well’s marginal
impact on the stream. Since the distance to the stream is a significant factor
in the marginal impact, they show that wells closer to the river will have a
higher price for a permit than wells at larger distances. A market with trad-
ing ratios for permit prices can create incentives for wells farther away from
stream to purchase permits. While intuitive, no empirical evidence for this
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claim exists in the literature. Trading ratios are most common in controlling
water pollution and air pollution. However, experiences within these mar-
kets have been mostly unsuccessful. Hoag and Hughes-Popp (1997) mention
trading ratios as one of the reasons that resulted in low participation in the
Tar-Pamlico River Basin water quality trading among point and nonpoint
pollution sources.
Furthermore, in theory, we know that tradeable permit markets can be
a cost-effective way of reducing environmental externalities (Montgomery,
1972). They provide significant advantages over other incentive-based poli-
cies, including flexibility to the right holders (Colby, 1990). However, due
to the presence of transaction costs, whether permit markets achieve their
objectives cost-effectively in practice is an empirical question. Ideally, we
would want to answer whether tradeable permit markets are cost-effective in
a “second-best” world when we can compare the cost-effectiveness of a trade-
able permit market with other alternatives as counterfactuals (Anderson and
Parker, 2013). While an appropriate counterfactual world is often not easy to
identify, we can study the performance of markets regarding reallocation of
resources (Ghimire and Griffin, 2014; Hadjigeorgalis, 2009) and the presence
of transaction costs.
Limited evidence exists on the performance of tradeable permit markets
compared to other policies in practice. The only study that the author is
aware of is Fowlie et al. (2012). They show that the REgional CLean Air
Incentives Market (RECLAIM) in California has reduced emissions by 20%
compared to a command-and-control policy. However, the performance of
tradeable permit markets in practice has often come under question. One
of the main critiques, especially at the local level, has been low partici-
pation rates (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997; Young, 1986; McCann, 1996).
The existence of transaction costs is suggested to be a primary reason for
low participation rates in permit markets (Hahn and Hester, 1989b; Stavins,
1995). Transaction costs in this context are two types: administrative costs,
such as establishing the market, monitoring and enforcement (Krutilla and
Krause, 2011) that are usually borne by the administration; and costs of mar-
ket transactions, such as making decisions, search, and bargaining. Market
participants carry these costs.
Market structure can also affect the costs borne by individuals. This study
provides insight into the presence of search costs in a local, informal ground-
7
water market with no central market clearing mechanisms. Most previous
studies have considered the cases of more sophisticated and active markets,
such as RECLAIM (Gangadharan, 2000; Fowlie et al., 2012) and lead phase-
down (Kerr and Mare´, 1998). Kerr and Mare´ (1998) studied the efficiency of
the lead phase-down market in the presence of transaction costs. Although
this market is considered one of the most successful examples of tradeable
permit markets to date, 70% of transactions took place between refineries of
the same companies. The preponderance of internal trades is consistent with
the existence of large transaction costs in the market. Kerr and Mare´ (1998)
find that smaller companies, smaller refineries and “refineries that do not
have other refineries to trade with within their company” are less likely to
trade. They study transaction costs as a function of firm characteristics and
do not consider quantity traded. They conclude that while tradeable permit
markets can be the cost-effective policy, markets with “small, non-integrated
and unsophisticated” participants could be less cost-effective.
Gangadharan (2000) studied firms’ participation decisions in the RECLAIM
while considering transaction cost covariates. They mention that most facil-
ities that trade multiple times tend to trade with the same trading partner
and this could be due to high search costs. They divide the facilities into two
groups: those that traded multiple times (low search cost) and those that
traded with different partners (high search costs). They show that search
and information costs can be significant and reduce the probability of trade
by more than 30%. However, their data do not include firm-level characteris-
tics. Furthermore, like Kerr and Mare´ (1998), they assume fixed transaction
costs.
Most water quantity and quality markets are informal and local. Carey
et al. (2002) suggest that “formal markets are the exception rather than the
rule” and develop a framework to study an informal water market with no
central market clearing mechanism and no publicly available prices for trades.
They define a network within which transaction costs are zero and compare
trades within and outside the network. They assume fixed transaction costs
which are homogenous among farmers. Their model provides hypotheses
regarding the frequency and size of the trades. Using the data from the
Westlands water market in California, they provide some evidence that while
the number of trades is higher for internal trades, the average size of trades
is larger in external trades.
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Regnacq et al. (2016) study the impacts of fixed and variable transaction
costs on trading behavior using the gravity model. They explain that vari-
able costs of transferring water between buyers and sellers (which includes
conveyance costs and transaction costs) depend on distance. They use dis-
trict level data of bilateral trades between 237 districts in California and
focus on short term leases from 1995 to 2007. They show that for a longer
physical distance between the districts, both the probability of trade between
them (extensive margin of trade) and the size of trade between the districts
(intensive margin of trade) decrease.
In this paper, I provide testable hypotheses regarding trading behavior and
search effort for profit-maximizing farmers in a market with search frictions.
I test the hypotheses for the case of the Twin Platte Natural Resources
District (TPNRD) groundwater market in Nebraska. In this district, a well
construction moratorium was set in place in 2004 to reduce stream depletion
from the Platte River, but transfers of groundwater rights based on depletion
from the Platte river were allowed. While most previous studies have used
aggregate data to study the performance of water markets (Colby et al.,
1993; Howitt, 1994; Hansen et al., 2007), this study analyzes a parcel-level,
geocoded dataset of trades. Tietenberg (2005) mentions three types of studies
in assessing the performance of tradeable permit markets: studies that focus
on Pareto optimality, studies that focus on cost-effectiveness, and studies on
market effectiveness. This study falls into the third category. Unlike the
first two, it does not compare the current regulation with a baseline scenario
(e.g. command-and-control) or global performance of the market and instead
focuses on the performance of the market given existing conditions.
The results provide evidence regarding the performance of the market in
reallocating groundwater extraction away from the river that follows intended
market structure. Furthermore, the results suggest that search frictions are
significant in the market reducing its cost-effectiveness. The upper bound on
the size of transaction costs is estimated to be around 40% of the price of
groundwater.
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2.2 Model
This section provides a theoretical framework of a profit maximizing farmer
searching for a trading partner in a market with search frictions. The model
considered here is applied to a market for groundwater pumping rights. How-
ever, it can be generalized to other natural or common pool resources.
Tradeable permit markets for natural resources are designed by setting
a cap on the aggregate extractable quantity of the resource and allowing
trades among individuals. Initially, the permits could be auctioned off or
grandfathered. The latter is usually the case for water rights because the
rights were established long before the markets were set in place. Due to
profitability of using the resource as an input, there is a demand for extracting
the resource. This demand often depends on time varying factors such as
prices and weather conditions where changes in time varying factors can
result in differential changes in demand among heterogenous individuals.
The binding constraint on available permits and profitability of using the
resource creates a market where those who have higher marginal values for
the resource can buy the rights from those who have lower marginal values.
Tradeable permit markets are often local and informal such that prices of
permits (or rights) are not publicly known and buyers and sellers need to
engage in a costly search process to find a trading partner. Search frictions
can have important implications for performance of markets in allocating
resources between supply and demand sides (Mortensen, 2011).
The framework used in this section is based on the model considered by
Mortensen (2011). Similar models have been used in understanding the per-
formance of labor markets, housing markets, and marriage markets (Rogerson
et al., 2005), but they have not been used in understanding the performance
of tradeable permit markets. In this model, buyers and sellers engage in a
costly process of finding each other while maximizing their expected income.
The decision of a buyer or a seller to trade is composed of two parts. First,
the individual maximizes their profit function to get the quantity they want
to trade, Q. Then, they look for a trading partner maximizing their expected
payoff, E
∞∑
t=0
V . Assuming a two step decision means that the quantity traded
is predetermined in the search process. In the next section, I provide some
argument that this assumption holds for the case of the market under study.
10
Thus, I take Q as given and exogenous to the search decision.
Buyers and sellers meet based on a matching function, m(u, v) which is a
function of the number of potential buyers, v, and potential sellers, u. This
function is increasing in both arguments, i.e. an increase in the number of
participants on either side will increase the flow of contracts. Further, it
is assumed that the matching function is homogenous of degree 1 in both
arguments so that the meeting rate for buyers and sellers is only a function
of (
v
u
) which is called the market tightness. The meeting rate for a seller is
εs =
m(u, v)
u
and for a buyer it is εb =
m(u, v)
v
. These meeting rates are
exogenous to buyers and sellers1.
For a seller, the problem is whether to sell their permits at a price drawn
from a known distribution, received from the potential buyer they met in
time t, or wait another period to find another buyer. Assuming an infinite
life for the farmer2, if they decide to sell their water rights at price ω, payoff
will be:
rWs(ω) = rωQ+ pi
0Q (2.1)
where r is the interest rate and it is assumed to be fixed over time, Ws(ω)
is the seller’s payoff from selling their rights, Q is the quantity sold, and pi0
is per unit profit of producing without the input. Equation 2.1 shows that
the payoff from selling permits is equal to the total amount that the seller
receives plus the infinite stream of income from producing without the input.
On the other hand, the seller can keep their permits and wait to find another
buyer. In that case, their payoff is:
rUs = pi
1Q+ αsεs
∫ ω¯
0
Max{0,Ws(ω)− Us} dF (ω)− gs(αs) (2.2)
where Us is the payoff from not selling rights in the current period, pi
1 is
the profit of producing with the input, ω¯ is the upper limit of permit prices
in the market, and F (.) is the CDF of prices. The seller can increase the
probability of finding a buyer, αs, by increasing their effort, gs(αs), where
g
′
s > 0 and g
′′
s > 0. Equation 2.2 shows that the payoff of not selling the
1I relax this assumption in the empirical section.
2Alternatively, we can assume a death rate with Poisson distribution, but this does not
qualitatively change the analysis.
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rights is equal to profit from producing with input plus expected gain from
finding a buyer in the future and making a trade. Equations 2.1 and 2.2 form
the Bellman equations for the seller.
Because Ws(ω) is strictly increasing in ω there exists a reservation price,
Rs, where Ws(Rs) = Us. It is the minimum price the seller is willing to accept
to sell their permits. If they receive a price higher than the reservation price,
they will sell their permits, while if the price is lower than Rs the individual
will wait for another buyer. Solving equations 2.1 and 2.2 for Rs, we get:
Rs =
∆pis
r
+
αsεs
r
∫ ω¯
Rs
(1− F (ω)) dω − gs(αs)
Q
(2.3)
Rs depends on the profit differential, ∆pi = pi
1 − pi0, and the price per
unit of permit, ω, less the per unit costs of search. Appendix 1 explains how
parcel-specific factors affect profit differentials in the context of groundwater-
fed irrigation. Taking the first order conditions to get the optimal effort we
have:
g′s(αs) =
εsQ
r
∫ ω¯
R
(1− F (ω)) dω. (2.4)
Equations 2.3 and 2.4 explain the behavior of a seller in the market. It
can be seen that the profit differential positively affects reservation price.
Participation of the buyers’ side affects the trading activity of the sellers in
two opposite ways: first, for a given reservation price, an increase in partic-
ipation of buyers will increase the chance of meeting a potential buyer and
thus increase a seller’s probability of trading their water rights. Second, an
increase in the participation of buyers increases the reservation price for a
seller making them less likely to sell their permits. Labor market literature
suggests that the former effect is stronger and thus an increase in the par-
ticipation of buyers increases trading activity of sellers. However, prices in
the market will increase as a result of higher reservation prices (Mortensen,
2011)3. Notice that search effort only depends on volume of trade and par-
ticipation in the market, and not on profits. Thus, in the case that quantity
is exogenous to search effort, we do not expect parcel level characteristics to
3In the labor market literature the Beveridge curve shows the relation between vacancies
and employment.
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affect search effort. The Bellman equations for a buyer are similar:
rWb(ω) = −rωQ+ pi1Q (2.5)
rUb = pi
0Q+ αbεb
∫ ω¯
0
Max{0,Wb(ω)− Ub} dF (ω)− gb(αb) (2.6)
The first equation shows the stream of income if the individual were to
buy Q units of permits and the second equation shows the payoff from not
buying rights and continuing to produce without the input4. The reservation
price for the buyer is defined as the maximum price they are willing to pay
so that they are indifferent between using the input for production and not
using it. Solving equations 2.5 and 2.6 for Rb and αb we get:
Rb =
∆pib
r
+
αbεb
r
∫ Rb
0
F (ω) dω − gb(α)
Q
(2.7)
g′b(αb) =
εbQ
r
∫ Rb
0
F (ω) dω. (2.8)
From equations 2.3 and 2.7 we can see that as a seller’s profit differential
increases, their reservation price goes up and the seller is less likely to sell
their permits. If a buyer’s profit differential increases, their reservation price
also increases and the buyer is more likely to buy permits. Since g(.) is convex
in α, equations 2.4 and 2.8 suggest that as the size of a trade increases, search
effort of a buyer or a seller increases.
The situation is complicated if there is a spatial externality that requires
application of a trading ratio or transfer coefficient to transfers. When a
trading ratio is applied, we can assume that price per unit of permit paid by
a buyer is (
ω
β
), where β is the ratio of the transfer coefficient of the seller
to that of the buyer. Thus, β directly affects the price paid by a buyer. In
the system the way it is defined, it is more expensive to buy a permit from
a seller with a lower trading ratio than to buy it from a seller with a higher
trading ratio. This suggests that there will be a higher demand from sellers
with higher trading ratios. Similarly, we can argue that sellers with a higher
4An advantage of this model over a neoclassical model is allowing heterogeneity of
buyers’ and sellers’ opportunity costs of trade. Instead of assuming that every agent can
simply be a buyer or seller and obtaining demand and supply curves, here their opportunity
cost depends on the type of activity they are engaged in.
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trading ratio receive higher prices per unit of permit and are more likely to
sell their permits.
2.3 Study Area
2.3.1 Twin Platte Natural Resources District
In 1969, 24 Natural Resources Districts (NRDs) were established based on
L.B. #1357 in accordance with natural river basins in Nebraska5 (Figure
2.1). NRDs were originally designed for water development projects, but
their responsibilities toward other land and water management, development
and protection programs in the districts have increased over time. The Twin
Platte Natural Resources District (TPNRD) is located within the Platte
River Basin and along the Platte River. It is responsible for management of
land and water in Arthur and Keith Counties and two-thirds of Lincoln and
McPherson Counties in western Nebraska (Figure 2.2). Agriculture is the
primary user of groundwater in the TPNRD and the major crop produced in
the district is corn. Average acres under corn production is about six times
larger than soybeans and almost six times that of wheat, the second and third
crops produced in Nebraska. Based on reports from University of Nebraska
extension, irrigated corn yields are on average more than three times that of
dryland corn in Nebraska and the gap is widening. The increasing difference
between dryland and irrigated yields has created a high demand for irrigation
within the state. An increase in corn prices within the past decade has further
increased the demand for irrigation.
Due to interconnections between groundwater and surface water, Nebraska’s
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) is required to evaluate surface wa-
ter supplies in each NRD every year and determine whether basins are “fully
appropriated” or “overappropriated”. If the use of water resources causes
or is believed to contribute to future limitations in water supply, the NRD
will be considered overappropriated. In 2004, DNR designated TPNRD as
overappropriated which meant that an immediate stay on constructing new
wells and increasing irrigated acres was put in place and that TPNRD was
5 A merger in 1989 reduced that number to 23 Natural Resources Districts.
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required to develop a management plan to reduce consumption to sustain-
able levels (Bleed and Babbitt, 2015). As a result of the management plan,
TPNRD only allows transfer of irrigated acres from one location to another
location such that the transfer does not lead to further increase in stream
depletion.
2.3.2 Rules of the Market
TPNRD is responsible for management of water resources within the district
and has designed rules and regulations for water transfers to comply with
the limitations set by DNR. TPNRD only allows trades within the district
and rights cannot be sold to or bought from groundwater users outside the
district. Furthermore, before any farmer can start irrigation, TPNRD has
to approve the trade including the number of acres that can be irrigated.
TPNRD is also responsible for monitoring and enforcement of the trades.
Groundwater rights in the district are defined based on the area of land
under irrigation and not the amount of water extracted. Thus, there is
no allocation or limit on the amount of groundwater that can be applied
on irrigated acres. While land rights and groundwater rights are defined
separately, farmers can only trade groundwater for acres under irrigation
such that when a farmer sells their groundwater right for an acre, that acre
should not be irrigated anymore. Furthermore, only permanent trades are
allowed to take place, and no leases or temporary transfers are allowed. To
reduce monitoring costs, TPNRD only approves trades that include an entire
parcel or certain portions of a plot that can easily be verified and monitored
during the growing season.
Since the primary purpose of the moratorium on the number of acres ir-
rigated was to reduce depletion from the Platte River, TPNRD defined a
transfer coefficient that translates pumping one unit of groundwater by a
farmer at a particular location within the district into expected depletion
from the river. This transfer coefficient is called the Stream Depletion Fac-
tor (SDF). A unique SDF is assigned to each section in the district. It is
calculated mainly based on hydraulic conductivity, saturated thickness, stor-
age coefficient, distance to the surface water feature and distance to the
aquifer boundary.
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To ensure that withdrawals from the river do not increase as a result of
transfers and perhaps even decrease over time, transferring irrigated acres
in the district is only allowed based on the stream depletion factors of the
old parcels and new parcels. Furthermore, transfers are “unidirectional”
and are adjusted in an asymmetric fashion. If the SDF of the new acres is
less than that of the old acres, the number of acres transferred can remain
the same. If the SDF of new acres is higher than the SDF of old acres, the
numbers of acres transferred decreases proportionally to the increase in SDF.
This adjustment ensures that stream depletion will either decrease or stay
the same after trading. Based on the argument presented in the previous
section, when the market is unidirectional, sellers with higher trading ratios
are still more likely to sell. However, in this case, buyers with lower trading
ratios do not pay a lower price per permit and are not more likely to buy.
2.3.3 Sources of Transaction Costs
There are two types of transaction costs in tradeable permit markets: costs
of implementation and costs of transactions. The first group is concerned
with designing the institutions, implementing the market, monitoring and
enforcement. These costs are usually borne by the governing body of the
market6. In the case of the TPNRD groundwater market monitoring costs
are shared between the district and traders. Although TPNRD is responsible
for monitoring, imposing limitations on acres traded passes some of the costs
to traders. On the other hand, transaction costs for participants are those
of gaining information about the market, making decisions, search costs and
bargaining costs.
The TPNRD groundwater market is an informal water market. There are
different definitions of informal water markets available within the literature
depending on the focus of the authors on various aspects of these markets.
In a more general definition, Carey et al. (2002) define an informal market
as an immature market where prices are not publicly known. In a study of
Australian water markets, Bjornlund (2004) defines an informal market as
one where the transfer of rights is temporary rather than permanent. Fi-
nally, Easter et al. (1999) define informality by the enforceability of trades
6Sometimes traders bear some of the costs, e.g. in some air pollution markets, partici-
pants were responsible for monitoring and reporting the amount of pollution.
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compared to formal markets. In this study, I use a definition closer to Carey
et al. (2002). Specifically, by an informal market I mean the situation where
trades are “coffee shop trades” and the search process usually consists of
buyers or sellers looking for each other by asking around if others are willing
to trade. There were no formal brokers present in the market during the
period of this study. Buyers and sellers had to search for potential traders,
which can be very costly. Search costs in the market, like most thin envi-
ronmental markets, are expected to be significant. Evidence for high search
costs is the dominance of internal trades and that most of the external trades
take place between neighboring buyers and sellers where more than half of
the trades took place within a distance of 5 miles (figure 2.3). Furthermore,
in a well-functioning market, we expect higher value trades to occur earlier
during the period when the market is active; in the sample studied here this
is not the case. Higher value trades take place during later years of market
activity perhaps due to the lack of information about the market during the
early stages of market activity and high information costs in the market.
Since gains from trade increase when there is more heterogeneity between
a buyer and a seller, and since there are spatial correlations in physical char-
acteristics of parcels, a short distance between traders could suggest that
traders forgo benefits of trading with more heterogeneous partners to avoid
high costs of finding a better trade.
2.4 Data
This study uses data on 92 trades that occurred between 2005 and 2013. The
data is a confidential dataset from TPNRD and contains the number of acres
traded in each transaction and information about buyers and sellers including
their geographic location. One of the advantages of the data over previous
studies is that parcel specific characteristics are available for irrigated acres.
However, we do not have access to the location of dryland acres that do not
trade. This is because dry acres do not deplete the Platte River and are not
of interest to TPNRD. A disadvantage of the dataset, though, is that it does
not contain prices of trades.
Field level data include soil type, pump rate and depth to water. The
data for well characteristics are collected from the Nebraska Department of
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Natural Resources well database which is publicly available. The data on
soil qualities are collected from the U.S General Soil Map (STATSGO) of
the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) of the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA). Futures prices of corn and diesel are
retrieved from the Quandl futures database. Precipitation data for North
Platte Airport station has been retrieved from the National Climatic Data
Center (NCDC) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the summary statistics for parcel level,
district level, and market-level characteristics for sellers and buyers. While
the number of trades is small, we can see significant variation across parcels.
Furthermore, major changes in the price of corn and weather conditions have
resulted in differences in district level characteristics. Figure 2.3 shows the
distribution of distances between new and old acres. As can be seen from
this figure, most of the trades have taken place within a 5 miles radius which
is consistent with high search costs in the market.
2.5 Econometric Strategy
The empirical part of the study comes in two parts. The first part stud-
ies whether the market tends to move groundwater extraction away from
the river to that stream depletion decreases, while the second part stud-
ies whether volume traded affects the physical distance between buyers and
sellers.
2.5.1 Effects of Stream Depletion Factor on Probability of
Trade
In this section, I examine the effects of stream depletion factor on the prob-
ability that a seller will sell their groundwater rights, or a buyer will buy
groundwater rights. As discussed in previous sections, the Twin Platte Nat-
ural Resources District adjusts trades in a unidirectional manner based on
the stream depletion factor. We expect this market structure to provide in-
centives for sellers with higher SDF to be more likely to sell and buyers with
lower SDF to be more likely to buy. I test these hypotheses using logit mod-
els for sellers and buyers separately, controlling for market-level time-varying
18
factors and parcel level characteristics.
Two different regressions for sellers and two regressions for buyers are
estimated. In the first regression, I directly control for time-varying factors
such as output price, the input price, and precipitation at the district level.
Due to data availability, I make some simplifying assumptions. Since the
major crop in the district is corn, it is assumed that corn is the only crop
produced. Further, it is assumed that all the irrigating parcels use diesel as
fuel for pumping groundwater. The unit of observation is a parcel of land
and the farmer owning an irrigated parcel makes the decision to sell their
irrigation rights for the parcel, and a farmer owning a dryland parcel decides
whether to buy water rights to irrigate their parcel. The data for the sellers’
regression comes from the subsample of irrigated parcels while the data for
the buyers’ regression comes from the subsample of dryland acres. The logit
regression model for sellers and buyers is as follows:
Prob(sell = 1|X) = exp(β0 + β1X + β2SDF )
1 + exp(β0 + β1X + β2SDF )
(2.9)
Prob(buy = 1|X) = exp(β0 + β1X + β2SDF )
1 + exp(β0 + β1X + β2SDF )
(2.10)
where X is a vector of district level characteristics such as the price of
diesel, price of corn, precipitation, and parcel specific characteristics such
as soil quality, pump rate and well depth. SDF is stream depletion factor,
and β2 is the coefficient of interest. We expect that a higher output price, a
lower input price, and a lower precipitation will increase market participation.
Furthermore, we expect that farmers with higher pump rates will be less likely
to sell and more likely to buy. Pump rate is a major factor in determining
irrigation decisions and is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. We expect
that farmers with deeper water levels will be more likely to sell and less likely
to buy since depth to water determines cost of pumping. Finally, we expect
medium soil qualities to be more likely to buy and low and high soil qualities
to be more likely to sell their water rights. Mathematical derivation of this
claim is provided in the Appendix. The intuition is that low quality soils
have low capacity to hold water, while high quality soils can capture most
of the precipitation. As a result, the difference between irrigated and non-
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irrigated profits is highest among some medium range of soil qualities where
irrigation can affect profits significantly.
The second logit model I estimate uses year dummies instead of time-
varying variables. These dummies control for all the factors that change
from year to year within the district. There may be other district-level time-
varying factors that affect the decision to trade which the first model does
not include. These variables may bias the effect of SDF on the decision to
trade. If they are correlated with SDF, the second model will be able to
capture these effects and produce unbiased estimates.
2.5.2 Effect of Volume of Trade and Market Participation on
Distance Between Buyers and Sellers
In this section, I estimate the effects of quantity traded on search effort of
participants. Here, the distance between a buyer and a seller is used as a
proxy for the search effort. In a market with no search frictions, we expect to
see no relationship between quantity traded and physical distance between
buyers and sellers. Here, I test the null hypothesis that amount traded does
not affect the physical distance between buyers and sellers. The following
OLS regression estimates the effect of volume of trade on the distance be-
tween buyers and sellers controlling for market, climatic, and spatial factors:
distancei = α0 + τ1Xi + τ2Qi + i (2.11)
where X is a vector of time-varying variables and spatial parcel char-
acteristics. The first group includes the price of diesel, price of corn and
precipitation. These factors can affect market conditions (for example, the
number of participants). The second group includes stream depletion factor
and portion of irrigated acres in a 2-mile radius. These factors can affect the
location of a parcel. For example, if a potential seller is located in a region
with high soil quality and water quality such that their neighbors are also
irrigating and they have a higher density of irrigated acres, they might need
to find buyers at a longer distance. A similar explanation holds for buyers.
Finally, I include the difference between sellers and buyers SDF to control for
the fact that distance may be merely driven by the difference in SDF rather
than quantity traded. Q is quantity traded and we are interested in τ2.
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One important assumption in estimating the effect of quantity traded on
distance is that quantity traded does not change over distance (and time).
The reason to believe this assumption holds in the case of TPNRD is that the
rights are defined based on acres and TPNRD does not allow the transfer
of quantities of acres that are difficult to monitor. Thus the decision to
buy or sell the rights should be made before looking for a trading partner.
Furthermore, these decisions are usually in forms that are also agriculturally
feasible, for example removing an end gun, drying half of a center pivot circle
or drying the entire parcel. There is also anecdotal evidence suggesting that
farmers decide the quantity they want to buy or sell and do not change that
quantity over time.
A concern that might arise in the OLS model is selection bias. This bias
may be of concern if those who decide to trade their water rights are different
from those who do not trade based on some unobservable characteristics. In
that case, the estimate will be biased and will not be representative of the
effect on the entire population. To correct this selection bias, a Heckman
two-step regression model is estimated where covariates of the first stage
are the same as the logit model. We run both OLS and Heckman two-step
models with time-varying covariates and with year dummies.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Effects of Stream Depletion Factor on Probability of
Trade
The results of logit regressions for trading activity of sellers and buyers are
shown in Table 2.3. Marginal effects at mean values are shown in Table
2.4. The probability that a seller will sell their groundwater rights when
all variables are kept at their mean is estimated to be 0.52%, while the
probability that a buyer will buy new water rights keeping everything at
their mean is 0.22%. Estimated probabilities look small mainly because the
number of individuals who traded their groundwater rights is much smaller
than those who did not participate in the market.
From Table 2.3 we can see that the effect of stream depletion factor on
sellers is significant, while the effect on buyers is not significant. These results
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hold for both regressions, and the coefficients are the same suggesting that
prices of corn and diesel, and district level precipitation can control for most
time-varying variables. While the marginal size of the effect is small due
to a significant number of non-participants in the market, the direction and
significance of both coefficients can be informative for the performance of
the TPNRD groundwater market. The positive sign on the stream depletion
factor for the sellers suggests that controlling for parcel level and market
level variables, sellers with higher stream depletion factors are more likely
to sell their groundwater rights. Stream depletion factor does not affect
the probability of trade for buyers. One reason for this finding might be
that while sellers with higher SDF have higher incentive to sell their permits
because they are more competitive in the market, buyers with lower SDF
do not necessarily have more incentives to buy the permits. As long as the
SDF of a buyer is lower than that of a seller, there is no advantage of having
lower SDF. This is consistent with the unidirectional nature of trades in
the market. Furthermore, buyers with lower SDF may have lower present
value for their investment. This is because if they decide to resell their water
rights in the future, they may be at a disadvantage because of their low SDF.
The other explanation is the presence of transaction costs of finding trading
partners. When search frictions are present in the market, buyers end up
trading with their neighbors. As we can see from Figure 2.4 most irrigated
acres are initially located in areas with high SDF. The presence of search
costs within the TPNRD is further discussed in the next subsection.
From Table 2.3 we can also see that most of the coefficients follow our
expectations. Corn prices have a positive and significant effect on partic-
ipation and probability of trade for both buyers and seller. Furthermore,
an increase in precipitation decreases the probability of trade for both sides,
and in drier years we are more likely to see trades taking place. Pump rate
also has a significant effect which suggests that it is an important variable
in the decision to trade groundwater rights. Sellers with higher pump rate
are less likely to sell, and buyers with lower pump rate are less likely to buy.
The coefficients on soil quality for sellers follows our expectation suggesting
that sellers with medium soil quality are less likely to sell. These results
also suggest that the relationship between soil quality and the probability
of participating in trade is non-monotonic for sellers. However, it does not
follow our expectation for the buyers showing buyers with both medium and
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high-quality soil are more likely to buy groundwater rights than those with
low-quality soils. The reason might be that maximum profit differential for
buyers takes place at a soil quality that is different from our definition of
medium soil quality which is silty soil.
2.6.2 Effect of Trade Quantity on Physical Distance
Effects of acres trades on physical distance for sellers and buyers are shown
in tables 2.5 and 2.6. In each table, column 1 shows the estimates from OLS
regression using prices and precipitation, column two shows OLS estimates
with time dummies, column 3 shows the Heckman selection model with prices
and precipitation and column 4 shows estimates for the Heckman model with
time dummies. Columns 3 and 4 only show the results of the second stage
of Heckman’s model.
The results show that quantity traded has a positive and significant effect
on distances between buyers and sellers in most regressions. For sellers, the
effect is significant in all regressions and is between 0.058 and 0.089 miles
per acre of groundwater sold. For buyers, the effect is only significant when
we include time dummies and the effect is between 0.067 and 0.071 miles
per unit of groundwater rights bought. Interpreting distance as a proxy
for search costs, one possible explanation is that those with larger quanti-
ties traded expect higher gains from trade and invest more in searching for
a trading partner. These results have two major implications. First, in a
market with no search frictions we expect quantities traded not to have any
effect on physical distance between buyers and sellers and distance should be
randomly distributed. However the positive coefficient on quantities traded
suggests that this is not the case and search frictions are, in fact, significant
in this market. While previous studies have either looked at fixed trans-
action costs of trades, or studied legal costs of trade ignoring search and
bargaining costs, I show that search costs are important and need to be
considered. Furthermore, while previous studies have mainly focused on the
effect of transaction costs on the probability of participation (extensive mar-
gin of trade), these results focus on the effects of transaction costs for the
trades that have already taken place (intensive margin of trade). Second, as
explained previously, in the market considered here, the quantities desired
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to be traded are determined prior to the search process. These results sug-
gest that the presence of high search costs results in buyers or sellers who
want to trade smaller quantities to do so within a close physical distance.
This trading behavior, however, results in loss of efficiency because of spa-
tial autocorrelation in physical parcel and aquifer characteristics. Due to
spatial autocorrelation, parcels that are closer to each other have less profit
differential than parcels that are at a longer distance.
Furthermore, the results show that both buyers and sellers with higher
SDFs search significantly shorter distances for trading partners. These results
confirm the findings in previous sections that one reason those with higher
stream depletion factors are more likely to trade is the presence of search
frictions. These results also suggest that presence of search costs can affect
those with lower SDF more significantly.
Comparing the results of OLS with the Heckman 2-step model, the results
show that selection is not significant for sellers and coefficients are very close.
However, the standard errors and significance levels suggest that the inverse
Mills ratio is correlated with some of the variables7. For buyers, the selection
into trade is significant. However, the effect of selection bias is very small
and the coefficients are close to OLS.
While I provided some evidence regarding the exogeneity of quantities to
the search process due to farmers’ decision processes and market structure,
here, I provide further evidence that quantity traded is predetermined in the
search process. If we assume that quantity is not predetermined in the search
process, we expect buyers or sellers to change their initially determined quan-
tities as a result of the search process. Since the market is thin and no single
price exists within the market, we expect prices to be determined separately
within trades. While we do not have access to prices of transactions and
prices are determined within a negotiation process, we can expect gains from
irrigation to affect the maximum willingness to pay and minimum willingness
to accept such that buyers with higher profit differential (from irrigation) of-
fer higher prices per “acre” of groundwater rights while sellers with lower
profit differential accept lower prices. Thus, we might expect quantity sold
to be affected by the buyer’s profit differential and quantity bought to be
affected by the seller’s profit differential. Tables 2.7 to 2.10 suggest that
7This multicollinearity is one of the limitations of the Heckman model when the first
and second steps have elements in common, e.g. Bockstael et al. (1990).
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this is not the case. In Table 2.8, the first two columns provide the re-
sults of regressing quantity purchased on buyers’ characteristics while the
last two columns show the result of regressing quantity sold on the difference
between parcel-level characteristics of the buyer and the seller. Similarly,
the first two columns of table 2.10 show the results of regressing quantity
bought on sellers’ characteristics while the last two columns show the results
of regressing quantity bought on the difference between the buyer and the
seller’s characteristics. These two tables suggest that parcel-level character-
istics of trading partners do not have a significant effect on quantity traded.
Tables 2.7 and 2.9 show the results of regressing physical distance of trades
on quantity traded controlling for parcel-level characteristics of the trading
partner and the difference between parcel-level characteristics of the trader
and the trading partner. These tables provide further evidence that profit
differential of the trading partner does not significantly affect the coefficient
of quantity traded. Taken together, these regressions suggest that quantity
is not endogenous to the search process.
2.6.3 Loss of Efficiency
In order to understand how significant search frictions are, we need to study
loss of efficiency that resulted from these transaction costs. To provide an
estimate of the size of transaction costs, I compare gains from trade for
the trades that had taken place to gains from trade if the individuals had
traded with a potential trading partner that maximized gains from trade.
Gains from trade were estimated as the difference between profit differential
of a buyer and profit differential of a seller where profit differential is the
difference between irrigated and dryland profits. Since I do not have data on
parcel level profits, I use the Water Optimizer program (Martin et al., 2007)
to estimate irrigated and dryland profits for each parcel. Water Optimizer
estimates average profit based on crop choice, irrigation type, fuel type, parcel
level characteristics and water availability. I estimated profit for each parcel
by taking into account the prices in a given year, soil type, irrigation type
(center pivot or gravity) and water characteristics8. Further, I assumed all
8I estimated depth to water table from the closest monitoring USGS well. However, as
cost of pumping does not significantly affect profit for the variations observed, I assumed
an average depth to water table of 100 feet for all parcels.
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parcels grow corn and use diesel as fuel.
Using the outputs from Water Optimizer, loss of gains from trade due
to transaction costs were estimated. Since a buyer and a seller in a trade
each could have their own “gain-maximizing” partner, I sum improvements
on gains from trade over all buyers and all sellers9. In aggregate, loss of
efficiency due to transaction costs in the Twin Platte Natural Resources
District is estimated to be $616,000 per year in nominal terms. Loss of
efficiency for sellers is estimated to be $229,000 per year, while it is estimated
to be $387,000 per year for buyers. On average, total efficiency loss is equal
to $59 per acre traded, or $64 per acre in 2016 dollars.
National Agricultural Statistical Service shows an average cash rent of $209
per acre for irrigated lands and $64 per acre for dryland in Lincoln county in
2016. The difference between irrigated and dryland land rental values shows
the annual value of groundwater for each acre, which is estimated to be $145.
Based on these values, efficiency loss due to search frictions is estimated to
be 39%.
Several points are worth noting here. First, The estimates reported may be
considered as an upper bound since all the potential trades may not take place
in the counterfactual world. Furthermore, this estimate may include other
transaction costs such as limitations imposed by the TPNRD on transferring
irrigated acres. Finally, Colby (1990) finds the average size of policy-induced
transaction costs including application and legal costs of purchasing water
rights for multiple states in the Western United States to be $91 per acre
foot (or 6% of the price) of water traded. Comparing this result to Colby
(1990), while they estimate costs of application and legal fees, I show that
search frictions can impose significantly larger efficiency losses compared to
one time transaction costs.
2.7 Conclusion
In recent years tradeable permit markets have received significant attention
as a solution to environmental and natural resources problems at global, na-
tional and regional scales. However, our experiences with them have been
very mixed. While markets like fishing quota markets have been successful
9As a result I end up with 182 individuals that could trade with another partner.
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(Newell et al., 2005), others like water quality trading markets have been
relatively unsuccessful in achieving their goals (Hahn and Hester, 1989a).
Thus it is very important to understand the performance of existing mar-
kets in reallocating resources. In this paper I studied the performance of a
local informal market by answering two main questions that have not been
answered before. The findings in this paper are also of interest to similar
permit markets.
First, I find evidence regarding the performance of the market in reallo-
cating groundwater extraction in the direction predicted. I find that while
sellers with higher SDF are more likely to sell their rights, this does not hold
for buyers. Since the market structure is unidirectional, in the sense that irri-
gated acres for the trades that increase stream depletion need to be prorated
while irrigated acres remain the same for the trades where stream depletion
decreases, these findings suggest that the market provides the expected in-
centives to the buyers and sellers. Furthermore, the results suggest that the
presence of search frictions and transaction costs can negatively affect the
probability of trade for buyers with lower SDF. This study is the first that
finds empirical evidence related to the successful performance of a trading
system with complex trading ratios.
Second, the results suggest that the presence of search costs can affect
the efficiency of the market by affecting the efficiency of trades that did take
place. This is important because most previous studies (Kerr and Mare´, 1998;
Gangadharan, 2000) have mainly focused on loss of efficiency due to lower
participation and not on the trades that had taken place with potentially
suboptimal trading partners. Chong and Sunding (2006) explain that most of
the studies on water markets are ex-ante predictions of their performance and
since they do not consider restrictions and transaction costs, they allow for
more trading activity than can happen in practice10. We further add to their
argument that studies that do not consider multiple sources of transaction
costs may underestimate loss of efficiency even within the trades that take
place.
Finally, the problem of search costs in tradeable permit markets seems
to be due to paucity of information about potential buyers and sellers. We
suggest that the presence of “match-makers” that charge a price less than
10For an example look at Vaux and Howitt (1984).
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cost of search per unit of permit can significantly increase the efficiency of
the market.
Two points are worth noting here. First, I have focused on the loss of
efficiency in the intensive margin of trade within the trades that have taken
place. The other portion of efficiency loss from search frictions is the loss due
to trades not taking place. While I provide an upper bound for the former,
it is important to note that this value does not include efficiency loss at the
extensive margin of trade. Second, the purpose of this study is to focus on
the cost-effectiveness of a tradeable permit market. It should be noted that
while I show evidence for loss of efficiency within the market under study,
this evidence is not enough to draw conclusions regarding the performance of
other policies. While search frictions may not exist in other forms of policies,
other transaction costs may produce larger losses in efficiency.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for acres for which water rights were sold
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Acres sold 92 56.775 55.083 0.500 261.580
distance from buyer (mi) 92 11.796 15.787 0.033 66.525
Stream depletion factor 92 64.551 27.715 1.000 96.000
Ratio of certified acres 92 0.326 0.175 0.022 0.757
within 2 miles
Static water level (ft) 92 63.743 72.604 4.000 257.000
Pumping water level (ft) 92 103.361 83.540 4.000 340.000
Depth of well (ft) 92 221.121 122.320 10.000 600.000
Low soil quality 92 0.533 0.502 0 1
Medium soil quality 92 0.217 0.415 0 1
High soil quality 92 0.250 0.435 0 1
Average monthly 92 0.053 0.017 0.027 0.073
precipitation (in)
Corn price (cents per bu) 92 551.842 134.803 219.215 685.489
Diesel price (US$ per gal) 92 3.485 0.616 2.393 3.965
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for acres for which water rights were bought
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Acres bought 91 59.015 55.235 0.500 261.580
distance from seller (mi) 91 11.922 15.828 0.033 66.525
Stream depletion factor 91 49.876 24.696 6.439 93.000
Ratio of certified acres 91 0.395 0.179 0.005 0.765
within 2 miles
Static water level (ft) 91 92.005 72.808 4.000 296.000
Pumping water level (ft) 91 134.593 85.652 4.000 375.000
Depth of well (ft) 91 282.868 118.727 40 495
Low soil quality 91 0.352 0.480 0 1
Medium soil quality 91 0.505 0.503 0 1
High soil quality 91 0.143 0.352 0 1
Average monthly 91 0.053 0.017 0.027 0.073
precipitation (in)
Corn price (cents per bu) 91 553.698 134.361 219.215 685.489
Diesel price (US$ per gal) 91 3.496 0.610 2.393 3.965
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Table 2.3: Results of logit regressions for sellers and buyers
seller buyer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stream depletion 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002
factor (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Diesel price −0.713 −0.626
(0.468) (0.471)
Corn Price 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Annual precipitation −16.409∗∗ −16.553∗∗
(6.988) (6.997)
Pump rate −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Static water level 0.002 0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
High soil quality −0.100 −0.103 1.665∗∗∗ 1.665∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.275) (0.382) (0.382)
Medium soil −0.840∗∗∗ −0.840∗∗∗ 1.929∗∗∗ 1.929∗∗∗
quality (0.289) (0.289) (0.291) (0.291)
Constant −4.661∗∗∗ −6.750∗∗∗ −6.013∗∗∗ −7.929∗∗∗
(1.088) (0.779) (1.004) (0.650)
Year dummies? No Yes No Yes
Observations 11,860 11,860 22,443 22,443
Log Likelihood −500.750 −491.229 −529.119 −520.028
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,019.501 1,008.458 1,076.238 1,066.056
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Marginal effects from logit regressions for sellers and buyers
seller buyer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stream depletion 0.0001 0.0001 0.000003 0.000003
factor
Diesel price -0.004 -0.001
Corn price 0.00003 0.00001
Average monthly -0.085 -0.036
precipitation
Pump rate -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Static water level 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00000
High soil quality -0.001 -0.0004 0.008 0.007
Medium soil quality -0.004 -0.003 0.009 0.008
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Table 2.5: Effects of quantity traded on physical distance using OLS and
Heckman 2-step regressions for sellers
OLS Heckman
selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acres sold 0.058∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026)
Stream depletion -0.234∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗
factor (0.061) (0.058) (0.088) (0.082)
Difference in stream 0.295∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
depletion factor (0.067) (0.062) (0.082) (0.078)
Ratio of certified acres -3.788 -7.465 -2.968 -5.727
(9.579) (9.423) (9.065) (8.458)
Corn Price -0.041∗ -0.046
(0.024) (0.031)
Diesel price 11.765∗∗ 12.423∗∗
(5.363) (5.851)
Average monthly -0.352 9.687
precipitation (89.468) (107.522)
Constant 0.516 14.571∗∗ 7.995 33.690
(12.215) (5.925) (29.823) (30.457)
Year dummies? No Yes No Yes
Observations 92 92 11,860 11,860
R2 0.341 0.459 0.342 0.462
Adjusted R2 0.287 0.385 0.279 0.380
ρ -0.201 -0.439
Inverse Mills Ratio -2.6 (9.4) -5.57 (8.5)
Residual Std. Error 13.335 12.384
F Statistic 6.2∗∗∗ 6.17∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.6: Effects of quantity traded on physical distance using OLS and
Heckman 2-step regressions for buyers
OLS Heckman
selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acres bought 0.044 0.067∗∗ 0.045 0.071∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027)
Stream depletion -0.279∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗
factor (0.077) (0.074) (0.064) (0.064)
Difference in stream 0.072 0.092 0.096 0.126∗
depletion factor (0.080) (0.069) (0.078) (0.071)
Ratio of certified -0.737 -5.273 7.691 5.155
acres (6.840) (6.876) (9.961) (9.463)
Corn Price -0.050∗∗ -0.040
(0.025) (0.028)
Diesel price 13.901∗∗ 12.306∗∗
(5.541) (5.607)
Annual monthly -16.833 -83.291
precipitation (90.992) (111.169)
Constant 2.097 16.615∗∗ -24.749 -34.291
(12.286) (7.201) (22.356) (23.574)
Year dummies? No Yes No Yes
Observations 91 91 22,443 22,443
R2 0.348 0.438 0.364 0.472
Adjusted R2 0.293 0.360 0.302 0.391
ρ 0.619 0.806
Inverse Mills Ratio 9.6 (6.4) 14.3∗∗ (6.2)
Residual Std. Error 13.307 12.660
F Statistic 6.334∗∗∗ 5.607∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.7: OLS regressions of distance for sellers when quantity is not
predetermined
Reg 1a Reg 2b
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acres sold 0.062∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
Corn Price -0.034 -0.029
(0.027) (0.030)
Diesel price 11.539∗∗ 9.555
(5.476) (6.047)
Monthly precipitation -59.931 -29.750
(103.910) (111.276)
Difference in stream 0.174∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.135∗
depletion factor (0.082) (0.077) (0.086) (0.081)
Ratio of irrigated 0.744 1.719 -3.017 -9.262
acres (9.686) (9.177) (9.613) (8.999)
Buyer’s total depth 0.027∗ 0.020
(0.014) (0.014)
Medium soil quality -6.259∗ -8.047∗∗
(buyer) (3.532) (3.507)
High soil quality -5.826 -8.004∗
(buyer) (4.830) (4.561)
Pump rate (buyer) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Difference in total 0.007 0.006
depth (0.012) (0.011)
Difference in pump -0.002 0.001
rate (0.002) (0.002)
Difference in soil -0.825 -1.584
quality (1.907) (1.763)
Constant -25.569∗ -2.441 -11.615 0.648
(13.397) (8.208) (13.366) (7.989)
Year dummies? No Yes No Yes
Observations 91 91 91 91
Residual Std. Error 12.853 12.021 13.831 12.524
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
a Reg 1 includes buyers’ characteristics
b Reg 2 includes the difference between buyer and seller characteristics
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Table 2.8: OLS regressions of quantity traded for sellers when quantity is
not predetermined
Reg 1a Reg 2b
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corn Price -0.021 -0.020
(0.101) (0.111)
Diesel price 10.816 13.111
(20.674) (22.558)
Monthly precipitation 301.819 350.292
(392.769) (415.971)
Difference in stream 0.194 0.213 0.158 0.228
depletion factor (0.309) (0.311) (0.322) (0.334)
Ratio of irrigated -87.876∗∗ -82.966∗∗ -121.884∗∗∗ -110.517∗∗∗
acres (35.016) (35.637) (32.994) (35.141)
Buyer’s total depth 0.176∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.052)
Medium soil quality -17.057 -12.332
(buyer) (13.275) (14.205)
High soil quality -3.690 0.640
(buyer) (18.304) (18.510)
Pump rate (buyer) 0.005 0.015
(0.009) (0.011)
Difference in total -0.041 -0.036
depth (0.044) (0.045)
Difference in pump 0.003 -0.001
rate (0.008) (0.009)
Difference in -2.490 -1.431
soil quality (7.138) (7.336)
Constant -4.543 14.015 39.815 56.379∗
(50.758) (33.281) (50.041) (32.630)
Year dummies? No Yes No Yes
Observations 91 91 91 91
Residual Std. Error 48.720 48.801 51.865 52.179
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
a Reg 1 includes buyers’ characteristics
b Reg 2 includes the difference between buyer and seller characteristics
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Table 2.9: OLS regressions of distance for buyers when quantity is not
predetermined
Reg 1a Reg 2b
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acres bought 0.075∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027)
Corn Price -0.041 -0.032
(0.029) (0.030)
Diesel price 10.406∗ 10.297∗
(5.892) (5.987)
Monthly precipitation -44.788 -42.834
(110.425) (110.442)
Difference in stream 0.199∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.182∗∗
depletion factor (0.081) (0.074) (0.085) (0.080)
Ratio of irrigated 5.519 -5.013 5.724 -6.434
acres (9.426) (9.452) (9.358) (9.882)
Buyer’s total depth 0.026∗ 0.015
(0.014) (0.013)
Medium soil -4.853 -5.601
quality (buyer) (4.114) (3.753)
High soil -3.889 -7.875∗∗
quality (buyer) (3.668) (3.441)
Pump rate (buyer) 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Difference in total -0.006 -0.004
depth (0.011) (0.011)
Difference in pump 0.003 0.00004
rate (0.002) (0.002)
Difference in soil 0.082 1.435
quality (1.935) (1.829)
Constant -16.382 2.016 -15.932 -1.161
(13.677) (8.270) (13.417) (7.866)
Year dummies? No Yes No Yes
Observations 91 91 91 91
Residual Std. Error 13.481 12.200 13.764 12.757
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
a Reg 1 includes sellers’ characteristics
b Reg 2 includes the difference between buyer and seller characteristics
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Table 2.10: OLS regressions of quantity traded for buyers when quantity is
not predetermined
Reg 1a Reg 2b
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corn Price 0.069 0.042
(0.113) (0.113)
Diesel price -6.710 2.661
(22.710) (22.879)
Monthly precipitation 300.095 287.186
(424.540) (420.885)
Difference in stream 0.682∗∗ 0.665∗∗ 0.427 0.440
depletion factor (0.302) (0.309) (0.322) (0.329)
Ratio of irrigated -109.329∗∗∗ -102.073∗∗ -112.060∗∗∗ -104.059∗∗
acres (34.260) (38.995) (33.556) (39.448)
Buyer’s total depth 0.075 0.082
(0.052) (0.054)
Medium soil -4.370 -3.336
quality (buyer) (15.856) (16.152)
High soil -16.632 -10.828
quality (buyer) (14.023) (14.761)
Pump rate (buyer) 0.005 0.005
(0.010) (0.011)
Difference in total 0.059 0.053
depth (0.043) (0.044)
Difference in pump -0.001 0.001
rate (0.008) (0.009)
Difference in soil 3.860 2.249
quality (7.385) (7.617)
Constant 41.875 30.895 42.777 43.572
(52.537) (35.430) (51.060) (32.396)
Year dummies? No Yes No Yes
Observations 91 91 91 91
Residual Std. Error 51.988 52.524 52.604 53.145
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
a Reg 1 includes sellers’ characteristics
b Reg 2 includes the difference between buyer and seller characteristics
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Figure 2.1: Map of Natural Resources Districts in Nebraska
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Figure 2.2: Map of the Twin Platte Natural Resources District
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of distance between buyers and sellers in trades
0
10
20
30
0 20 40 60
Distance between a buyer and a seller
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
41
Figure 2.4: Distribution of sold (red), bought (blue) and irrigated (grey)
acres over sections with stream depletion factors: high (dark) to low (light)
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CHAPTER 3
EFFECTS OF INSTANTANEOUS
GROUNDWATER AVAILABILITY ON
IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR AQUIFER
MANAGEMENT
3.1 Introduction
Groundwater aquifers are important sources of water supply for irrigated
agriculture. Physical aquifer characteristics impose limitations on the rate
that a farmer can extract groundwater during the growing season. The ex-
isting economics literature and current policies do not take into account the
effect of limited extraction rates on farmers’ irrigation decisions. This paper
has two objectives. First, to develop an analytical framework to study the ef-
fects of maximum available groundwater flow rate from an aquifer on a profit
maximizing farmer’s irrigation decisions about the number of irrigated acres
and expected groundwater application per acre. Second, to analyze whether
maximum available groundwater flow rate is important for determining the
effectiveness and equity of different aquifer management policies.
Groundwater is a major source of water supply for agricultural production.
It provides water for about 40% of the irrigated land in the world (Siebert
et al., 2010). Groundwater aquifers provide a reliable and flexible source
of water supply for very sophisticated production systems like those of the
American West, while also providing food security for some of the densely
populated rural areas of developing countries such as India and China (Shah,
2014). However, the reliability and flexibility of groundwater aquifers has
resulted in rapid depletion of the aquifers in many groundwater-dependent
agricultural areas. Changes in aquifer levels have put pressure on irrigated
agriculture and raised concerns regarding the effect of declining aquifer levels
and groundwater availability on irrigated agriculture and on the types of
policies required to protect the aquifers (OECD, 2015; Peterson et al., 2003).
Unfortunately, there exists a disconnection between agronomic and engi-
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neering literatures and economics literature on the effects of physical aquifer
characteristics on crop production. Most existing economic studies of ground-
water management (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Caswell and Zilberman, 1986;
Knapp and Olson, 1995) consider the aquifer as a stock of groundwater.
These studies assume that the aquifer affects farmer decisions only through
depth to the groundwater table and marginal pumping cost (Upendram,
2009). An implicit assumption in these studies is that the maximum possible
extraction rate from the aquifer is infinite and a farmer can continuously meet
crop water demand during the growing season. Agronomic and engineering
studies, however, show that physical aquifer characteristics affect maximum
rates of groundwater extraction from an aquifer and that the maximum ex-
traction rate can affect crop yield. Since the goal of most aquifer manage-
ment policies is to stabilize aquifer levels or slow down aquifer depletion,
overlooking the effect of instantaneous groundwater availability on irrigation
decisions through its effects on crop yield could result in miscalculating the
effectiveness of studied policies. Furthermore, because farmers’ access to in-
stantaneous groundwater flow can vary significantly within a basin, these
policies ignore the heterogenous effect they can have among farmers.
In this study, we introduce an analytical framework of a profit-maximizing
farmer to address the effect of instantaneous groundwater availability, or
well capacity, on irrigation decisions on the extensive and intensive margins.
We then explore the implication of heterogeneity among farmers in terms of
access to groundwater within a growing season for the impacts of climatic
changes and pricing policies on irrigation decisions among farmers.
The analytical results show that the effect of instantaneous groundwater
availability on intensive and extensive margin decisions are nonlinear. We
find a well capacity (the switching point) above or below which irrigation de-
cisions are different. This switching point is a function of crop water demand,
irrigation technology, soil characteristics, weather conditions, and prices of
water (or energy) and crops. For well capacities above the switching point, a
profit-maximizing farmer can irrigate their entire parcel while adjusting the
intensive margin for changes in maximum groundwater flow rate. A profit
maximizing farmer with lower well capacity than the switching point, how-
ever, will adjust their irrigated acres to provide enough capacity to meet crop
water demands during the critical stages of the growing season. These results
have two major implications: 1) price elasticity of demand is not monotonic
44
among profit maximizing farmers with different well capacities, and farmers
with some intermediate range of well capacities are most responsive to the
changes in price of water; and 2) the effect of changes in average weather
conditions may not be monotonic among farmers either, with intermediate
capacity wells the most vulnerable to drier weather conditions. Finally, us-
ing well level data from the Upper Republican Natural Resources District in
Nebraska, we explore the effect of aquifer heterogeneity on cost-effectiveness
and distributional effects of four different policies that intend to reduce con-
sumptive water use. These policies include a pumping tax, an acreage tax,
and two policies that limit irrigated acres. The policy analysis shows that
different policies can result in different responses on the intensive and exten-
sive margins among farmers. While a pumping tax is the cost-effective policy
to reduce irrigation in this case, it mainly affects farmers with medium and
high capacity wells. On the other hand, a tax on the irrigated acres primarily
affects low capacity wells. Thus in cases where targeting low capacity wells
provides higher benefits for the aquifer, or when lower well capacities are a
result of historical over-pumping by farmers, an acreage tax might be the
preferred policy. However, in cases where lower well capacities are merely
a result of underlying aquifer characteristics (e.g. uneven bedrock levels), a
pumping tax might be the preferred policy.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, most eco-
nomics studies of groundwater management in agriculture do not fully take
into account the effects of physical aquifer characteristics on farmers’ irriga-
tion decisions. Some previous studies (Brozovic´ et al., 2010; Guilfoos et al.,
2013) have analyzed the effects of aquifer characteristics on the extent of spa-
tial externalities among farmers. However, this literature does not include
the effects of groundwater flow rate on irrigation decisions. While some stud-
ies suggest that daily water availability affects farmers’ irrigation decisions
(e.g. Pfeiffer and Lin (2014)), they do not take into account the effect of
aquifer characteristics on maximum groundwater flow rate. This study is
the first to provide an analytical framework to study the effects of maximum
groundwater flow rate on farmers’ irrigation decisions.
We also contribute to studies on the effects of heterogeneity among farm-
ers on irrigation decisions. Caswell and Zilberman (1986) and Lichtenberg
(1989) have looked at the effect of soil properties and depth to water on
irrigation decisions. This study adds maximum available groundwater flow
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rate as a source of heterogeneity among farmers and shows that this source
of heterogeneity can be important on the extensive and intensive margins.
We further contribute to the literature on the effectiveness and distributional
effects of aquifer management policies. Feinerman and Knapp (1983) show
that pumping taxes and quotas can achieve allocation efficiency; however,
they will have different distributional effects on groundwater users. We add
another layer to the policy discussion by showing that different policies could
have differential effects on different types of farmers based on their access to
maximum groundwater flow rate.
3.2 Previous Studies
3.2.1 Agronomic Studies
Agronomic and extension studies suggest that crop water demand depends
on evapotranspiration (ET) and is distributed over the entire growing season
(Lamm et al., 2007). Crop water demand is higher and crop yield is more
susceptible to water stress in critical stages of growth (Rogers et al., 2015;
Schneekloth et al., 2009; Martin et al., 1984). Thus, it is important to be
able to meet crop water demand during the critical stages of crop growth
(Martin and Gilley, 1993). If daily water demand is not satisfied over the
critical stages of the growing season, the crop canopy might die, at which
point adding more water does not increase yield. Thus, deficit irrigation
during the critical stages of the growing season can result in a negative im-
pact on crop yield (Andales, 2009). This literature also suggests that every
crop needs a minimum amount of evapotranspiration in order to produce har-
vestable biomass. This minimum amount is called the threshold ET and it is
different among crops. In wet years, this amount is provided by precipitation.
However, in dry years, irrigation needs to provide the required water to meet
the threshold (Rogers et al., 2015). There is also a plateau of yield. When
a crop reaches maturity, adding more water does not significantly increase
yield.
On the other hand, instantaneous supply of groundwater is limited by
groundwater levels and physical aquifer characteristics such as hydraulic con-
ductivity and specific yield, which are measures of the flow of groundwater
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in the aquifer (Hecox et al., 2002). Instantaneous groundwater supply from a
well is often referred to as well capacity and is defined as the maximum vol-
ume of water that can be extracted in a given time (e.g. gallons per minute).
With limited instantaneous groundwater availability, the ability to meet crop
water demand during the critical periods in the entire parcel decreases, which
can result in crop stress and loss of yield (Schneekloth and Andales, 2009).
However, the ability to meet crop water demand during critical stages of the
season is not exogenous. A farmer can allocate the number of irrigated acres
at the beginning of the growing season in order to meet water demand. Thus,
the potential crop yield per irrigated acre depends on the maximum appli-
cation rate per acre (O’Brien et al., 2001), which is defined as well capacity
divided by the number of irrigated acres.
Finally, previous studies suggest that weather can affect irrigation decisions
in two ways. First, in a dry year, a farmer needs to apply more water during
the season to supplement reduced precipitation and attain the same crop
yield as in a wet year. Second, in a dry year, a farmer needs to allocate
higher maximum application rates per acre to provide the crop with enough
soil moisture during the critical stages of the growing season. In other words,
in a dry year, a farmer that allocates low maximum application rate per acre,
with the same amount of water applied, will get a lower crop yield than a
farmer that allocates high maximum application rate per acre (Lamm, 2004;
Lamm et al., 2007) because they can not meet demand during critical stages
of the season.
3.2.2 Economic Studies
In efforts to incorporate these characteristics into economic models, most
existing studies have focused on the optimal irrigation scheduling within a
growing season (Shani et al., 2004; Hornbaker and Mapp, 1988; Feinerman
and Falkovitz, 1997; Yaron and Dinar, 1982). A common conclusion among
most of these studies is that applying water during the critical stages of the
growing season is an important factor that affects crop growth and determin-
ing harvestable crop yield. However, they have not considered instantaneous
groundwater supply limitations. Recently there have been several studies
that include limitations on the instantaneous groundwater availability, most
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of which focus on numerical analysis.
Peterson and Ding (2005) studied the effect of irrigation efficiency on wa-
ter saving by considering well capacity and risk preferences. They broke
down the production function into four stages to capture the intra-seasonal
nature of crop water demand and irrigation decisions. They find that water
application at different stages of crop growth has different effects on crop
yield. Interestingly, for all irrigation technologies, under a higher well ca-
pacity, farmers apply less water at early stages and apply more water later
in the season resulting in higher seasonal application regardless of their risk
preferences.
Upendram (2009) studied the risk-efficient choice of crop, technology and
irrigation timing for a risk-averse farmer in western Kansas. They used
management allowed deficit (MAD) as a decision variable that determines
irrigation timing. MAD is the amount of deficit in the soil profile that triggers
irrigation. Their results show that well capacity is an important factor for
the choice of irrigation technology and irrigation strategy.
Both Peterson and Ding (2005) and Upendram (2009) assume a fixed num-
ber of irrigated acres in their models. This is a limitation because allocating
irrigated acres at the beginning of the season is an endogenous decision based
on well capacity. Foster et al. (2014) showed that not only the decision on the
soil moisture target, which is similar to MAD, but also number of irrigated
acres matter for crop yield and water use. They show that with high well
capacities seasonal groundwater availability can be a binding factor, while
with low well capacities well capacity is a limiting factor that can limit the
number of irrigated acres and groundwater application. Foster et al. (2015a)
further show that well capacity is a more important determinant of farmers’
decisions on the number of irrigated acres, seasonal water use and profits
than depth to water.
While some empirical studies claim that groundwater availability during
the critical stages of the growing season matters, they do not explicitly ac-
count for limitations in instantaneous groundwater availability in their anal-
ysis (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014). There have been a few studies that, study
the effects of instantaneous groundwater availability on irrigation decisions
and land prices. Using a hedonic approach, Brozovic et al. (2010) estimated
the value of groundwater for Chase County in Nebraska. Their results show
that well capacity is an important determinant of the price of an irrigated
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parcel. This finding suggests that limitations on instantaneous groundwa-
ter availability can affect irrigation decisions. Collie (2015) explicitly asked
whether well capacity affects irrigation decisions. Using an instrumental
variable approach they show that well capacity affects irrigation decisions
on the extensive and intensive margins. Specifically, they show that for the
case of Kansas, farmers with higher well capacities irrigate more acres, and
grow crops that are more water intensive, suggesting that they irrigate larger
quantities per acre.
Finally, there have also been few studies that included analytical frame-
works with groundwater supply limitations included in the model. Wang and
Nair (2013) study the effect of limitations on seasonal groundwater availabil-
ity on irrigation decisions on the intensive and extensive margins. They argue
that seasonal limitations could be a result of limited well capacity. They show
that when seasonal groundwater supply is limited, a farmer will extract all
the available seasonal supply and does not conserve groundwater, and as a
result is unresponsive to changes in price of water. However, their model
does not consider intra-seasonal effects of well capacity on crop yield and
irrigation decisions and merely models well capacity limitations as a seasonal
limitation on groundwater availability.
Peterson and Saak (2013) is the only study that considers the effect of
well capacity on crop revenue in an analytical framework. They studied the
difference in the steady state groundwater levels under competitive and plan-
ning conditions with different aquifer thicknesses. In their model, revenue is
a function of water application and saturated thickness suggesting that as
saturated thickness decreases, well capacity decreases and as a result, revenue
decreases. Their results suggest that well capacity does affect the difference
in aquifer levels between planning and competitive scenarios. A limitation of
their model is that it does not consider the intensive and extensive margin
decisions of a farmer. Not considering the decisions on the intensive and ex-
tensive margins explicitly can result in overestimating water use and profits
when well capacity is low.
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3.3 Analytical Framework
In practice, irrigation decisions are made in two stages. At the beginning of
a growing season, a farmer allocates irrigated acres (extensive margin) based
on water availability. During the growing season, they will apply water (in-
tensive margin) to meet daily crop water demand. I develop a production
function that captures both the inter-seasonal and intra-seasonal nature of
irrigation decisions. The production function, G(
X
A
, )Φ(u, µ+ , σ), is com-
posed of two parts: an intra-seasonal part and an inter-seasonal part. The
intra-seasonal part of the function, Φ(u, µ+ , σ), provides a relationship be-
tween expected seasonal groundwater application per acre (irrigation depth),
u, and expected crop yield under current climate conditions assuming no
limitations on groundwater availability. This part of the production function
follows a cumulative distribution function (CDF). Previous literature shows
that the intra-seasonal irrigation decision in a stochastic environment can be
characterized by an optimal soil moisture target strategy (Shani et al., 2004;
Mieno, 2014). In a stochastic environment, any soil moisture target will re-
sult in an expected groundwater application and an expected crop yield. A
farmer can thus set a soil moisture target based on the distribution of precip-
itation to maximize expected crop yield given expected seasonal water use.
The Φ(u, µ + , σ) function is the solution to the stochastic intra-seasonal
optimization of the farmer for each soil moisture target. While the optimiza-
tion has not been solved analytically in this chapter, the process is similar
to Cropper (1976) in that a CDF is used to model a stochastic process. This
characterization allows me to provide tractable closed form solutions.
The CDF also includes biophysical characteristics of the crop, soil and
irrigation technology, µ and σ under current climatic conditions. A larger
µ corresponds to a crop with higher demand for water, while higher σ can
be used to show a crop that is more sensitive to declines in seasonal water
application so that as seasonal water application decreases from the yield
maximizing level, crop yield decreases more. Similarly, more efficient tech-
nologies or different soil types can affect µ or σ. The intra-seasonal part of
the production function also includes a parameter that captures changes in
climate, . Φ(.) provides crop yield under existing stochastic climate con-
ditions, while  can be thought of as an index that shifts the production
function, e.g. due to climatic changes. A higher  shows a drier climate. In
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a drier climate, for a given well capacity and irrigated acres, the expected
seasonal application needs to be higher to achieve the same expected crop
yield figure 3.1b).
Furthermore, a CDF form provides us with several features that map to
crop water production function. First, the lower tail of the CDF function can
be interpreted as the threshold ET below which crop yield is zero. Second,
the upper tail of the CDF function can be interpreted as the plateau of
crop yield when the crop reaches maturity and adding more water does not
significantly increase crop yield. Finally, it provides us with the ability to
captures the effect of a change in weather on crop yield. It suggests that
the marginal value of water is highest at some intermediate amount of water
applied and not for the first unit of water applied. This non-monotonicity
explains the intra-seasonal nature of crop growth.
Limitations on instantaneous groundwater availability can affect crop yield
negatively by affecting a farmer’s ability to meet crop water demand dur-
ing the growing season. The second component of the production function,
G(
X
A
, ), captures the effect of instantaneous groundwater availability on crop
yield. It includes the maximum application rate, (
X
A
), which is the ratio of
well capacity, X, over irrigated acres, A. Maximum application rate directly
affects the seasonal production function, and is an important part of farmers’
decision making (New et al., 2000). With high maximum application rates,
a farmer is able to meet crop water demand over the entire growing season.
As maximum application rate decreases a farmer’s ability to meet crop wa-
ter demand optimally during the critical stages of the growing season where
the demand is the highest also decreases. As a result, attainable (expected)
crop yield decreases. This effect is more significant in a dry climate. In wet-
ter climates, a reduction in maximum application rate does not significantly
affect expected crop yield since rainfall can supplement for irrigation and
soil moisture levels are higher. However, in a drier climate, a reduction in
maximum application rate could result in not being able to meet crop water
demand during the critical stages of the season and significant loss of crop
yield. Another way to interpret this relation is that for high well capaci-
ties a farmer is able to buffer for any weather condition. However, with low
well capacities, the potential crop yield significantly depends on the weather
conditions during the growing season (figure 3.1a). The farmer makes the
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decision regarding the irrigated acres at the beginning of the growing season.
When instantaneous groundwater supply is limited, an increase in number
of irrigated acres can decrease maximum daily application rate which can
negatively affect crop yield.
G(
X
A
, ) can be thought of as a penalty function with the domain [0, 1).
The properties of the G(.) function are: G1(
X
A
, ) ≥ 0, G11(X
A
, ) ≤ 0, and
G2(
X
A
, ) ≤ 0, where G1() and G11() are first and second partial derivatives
with respect to the first argument, and G2() is the first order partial deriva-
tive with respect to . Finally, for every , G(0, ) = 0 and lim
X
A
→∞
G(
X
A
, ) = 1.
These properties maintain that for very high maximum daily groundwater
availability, the farmer can buffer for dry weather and crop yield will not suf-
fer. However, as maximum daily availability of groundwater decreases, the
effect of daily groundwater availability on crop yield increases at an increas-
ing rate because the farmer is not able to meet crop water demand during the
critical stages of the season when demand is high. This assumption states
that intra-seasonal profit maximizing strategies depend on the maximum
amount of water that a farmer can extract from a well. Consequently, we
assume that there does not exist an irrigation scheduling and intra-seasonal
allocation that can provide the same crop yield with lower maximum daily
application rate per acre. This assumption suggests that if a farmer real-
locates water from the periods of critical demand, crop yield will decrease.
It is important to note that this does not mean that there exists a single
profit maximizing strategy within the season, but rather that all irrigation
strategies with lower maximum daily application rates provide weakly lower
profits. Based on the characterizations of the inter and intra-seasonal parts
of the production function, we can solve the problem of allocating exten-
sive and intensive margins simultaneously. A farmer maximizes the expected
profit by allocating irrigated acres and groundwater application per acre for
a given climate:
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Max
A,u
A
{
G(
X
A
, )Φ(u, µ+ , σ)− Γ(Y )u
}
subject to Au ≤ h(X)
A ≤ 1
A, u ≥ 0
(3.1)
where Y is saturated thickness that shows the aquifer level and Γ(Y ) is
marginal cost of pumping a unit of water with Γ′(Y ) > 0, i.e. as aquifer lev-
els decline, marginal cost of pumping groundwater increases. For simplicity
we are assuming that well capacity does not affect the cost of pumping. In
practice, with lower wells a farmer needs to irrigate more hours to achieve the
same irrigation depth. Thus pumping cost is higher with lower well capaci-
ties. Also, as mentioned in the previous Section, saturated thickness affects
well capacity. However, in this model, well capacity and saturated thick-
ness are considered separately in order to explain the effects of instantaneous
groundwater availability on irrigation decisions. G(
X
A
, )Φ(u, µ+, σ) is crop
yield per acre, or revenue with price of output set to 1. The maximum attain-
able yield is standardized to 1 in the analytical model. h(X) is the maximum
amount of groundwater available during the growing season and is a function
of well capacity. It is the integral of the instantaneous amount of groundwa-
ter available over the season. In a simple way, it can be thought of as the
number of days in a growing season times the maximum daily groundwater
available. This is the case when well capacity does not decline during a sin-
gle growing season, which is usually the case, for example in the American
West. In a more general case, well capacity can decline during the season as
groundwater is pumped out of the aquifer, for example in hard rock aquifers
of India. However, we focus on the case where groundwater availability does
not decline over the season. The second constraint in equation 3.1 shows the
limit on the proportion of the acres that can be irrigated. It is important
to mention that in this model, non-irrigated profits are fixed at zero. This
is a simplification in the interest of analytical simplicity and does not affect
results in a meaningful way. Given the basic model, we then provide the
Lagrangian of the maximization problem:
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L = A
{
G(
X
A
, )Φ(u, µ+ , σ)− Γ(Y )u
}
+ λ1[h(X)− Au] + λ2[1− A]
(3.2)
where λ1 is the shadow value of adding one unit of water during the season
by increasing well capacity and λ2 is the shadow value of adding an irrigated
acre. Since A = 0 if and only if u = 0, we only focus at the case where
A, u > 0. Thus, the first order conditions are:
∂L
∂A
=
{
G(
X
A∗
, )− (X
A∗
)G′(
X
A∗
, )
}
Φ(u∗, µ+ , σ)− Γ(Y )u∗ − λ1u∗ − λ2 = 0
∂L
∂u
= A∗
{
G(
X
A∗
, )Φ′(u∗, µ+ , σ)− Γ(Y )− λ1
}
= 0
(3.3)
where A∗ and u∗ are the profit-maximizing levels of intensive and extensive
margin decisions for different well capacities. The first term in the first
equation shows that keeping everything fixed, adding an acre increases profit
due to production in one more irrigated acre, while it decreases profit because
adding an acre would reduce maximum daily application rate for the entire
parcel. {G(X
A∗
, )−(X
A∗
)G′(
X
A∗
, )} is always positive because G(.) is concave
in maximum daily application rate, suggesting that the positive effect of
adding an acre on crop production always outweighs its negative effects from
daily groundwater availability. We suppress the star notation for the sake of
notational simplicity.
In order to explain the effect of instantaneous groundwater availability on
irrigation decisions over the domain of well capacity, [0,∞), we solve for A
and u by decreasing well capacity from infinity to zero and provide the results
in three propositions. The first proposition provides the profit-maximizing
decisions under infinite well capacity which is the assumption underlying
existing economics literature. The following propositions deviate from this
condition by looking at well capacity rates less than infinity.
Proposition 11. As X →∞, A∗ = 1 and u = u∗∞(Y, µ, σ, ).
1All proofs are provided in Appendix B.
54
Proposition 1 shows that when instantaneous groundwater availability
reaches infinity, profit-maximizing quantity of water applied is a function
of cost of pumping, crop characteristics, technology, soil type and weather.
Even though this is a theoretical result, since infinite well capacity does
not exist in practice, this is an important result in explaining the effect of
instantaneous groundwater availability on irrigation decisions. This proposi-
tion suggests that there exists an optimal intensive margin allocation when a
profit-maximizing farmer has access to unlimited amounts of water on every
day of the irrigation season. From a modeling perspective, this condition is
similar to the case considered within the majority of the economics literature
where instantaneous groundwater availability does not affect crop yield, and
where pumping cost is the only factor affecting irrigation decisions.
Proposition 1 also suggests that under these conditions, the profit-maximizing
decision is either to irrigate the entire parcel or irrigate zero acres. Finally, an
increase in pumping cost will result in further deficit irrigation, but does not
affect the extensive margin decision. The next three propositions explain
that if well capacity is finite, daily groundwater availability affects irriga-
tion decision. They further explain how profit-maximizing decisions change
if maximum groundwater availability decreases, keeping other parameters
fixed.
Proposition 2. For high (finite) well capacities, the optimal decision is
to irrigate the entire parcel, A = 1, at a rate less than U∗∞. The application
rate per acre decreases as well capacity decreases.
When well capacity is infinite, a farmer can irrigate the whole parcel, ap-
ply groundwater optimally over the growing season, U∗∞, and meet daily
crop water demand. As well capacity decreases, maximum daily application
rate per acre decreases. With lower maximum daily application rate, the
farmer’s ability to meet daily crop water demand during the critical stages of
the growing season decreases. They can apply the same amount of seasonal
water by reallocating the quantity from the peak demand days to off-peak de-
mand days of the growing season (e.g. earlier or later in the growing season).
However, the marginal effect of irrigation is lower when applied during the
off-peak days of the growing season. As a result, the profit maximizing quan-
tity of groundwater applied per acre decreases. For high well capacities the
effect of daily groundwater availability is practically small, because for high
well capacities, a small decrease in maximum daily groundwater availability
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does not significantly affect crop yield. However, for lower well capacities,
this effect becomes more significant. This suggests that practically, for very
high well capacities, daily groundwater availability does not affect irriga-
tion decisions. For aquifers with high saturated thicknesses, well capacity is
practically very high. This might be one reason that earlier studies did not
include instantaneous groundwater availability in their models. Proposition
2 also provides the decision rule for high well capacities: as well capacity
decreases from infinity, keeping everything else fixed, the profit-maximizing
decision is to irrigate the entire parcel and adjust on the intensive margin.
Finally, it is important to notice that the reduction in the amount of
water application is not due to seasonal groundwater availability, but rather
because of the impact of maximum daily groundwater availability on crop
yield. There is limited storage capacity within the soil profile. With this
limited storage capacity the farmer is not able to store enough water within
the soil profile to meet crop water demand during the critical stages of the
growing season. Furthermore, applying more water at the initial periods of
crop growth could result in undesirable growth in crop roots that could affect
crop yield.
Proposition 3. There exists a well capacity, Xs, where a profit maximiz-
ing farmer with a higher well capacity can irrigate their entire parcel, while
a profit maximizing farmer with well capacity below Xs will decrease the
number of irrigated acres to be able to meet crop water demand during the
season. I call the point, the switching point.
At infinite well capacity, the shadow value of adding an acre is positive.
As well capacity decreases from infinity, shadow value of adding an acre of
irrigated land decreases. At Xs(µ, σ, , Y ), the shadow value of adding an
acre reaches zero. At this point the decision switches from adjusting on the
intensive margin to adjusting on the extensive margin, i.e. for well capaci-
ties above Xs, the profit maximizing decision is to irrigate the whole parcel
and adjust per acre application, while at well capacities below Xs the profit
maximizing decision is to adjust proportion of irrigated acres and keep the
application rate fixed. The reason is that when well capacity is below Xs,
if the farmer irrigates the whole parcel, reduction in maximum daily appli-
cation rate significantly affects crop yield because the farmer is not able to
meet crop water demand effectively during the growing season. As a result,
the farmer reduces the proportion of acres irrigated to keep maximum daily
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application rate,
X
A
, at a minimum, kmin. They will not decrease maximum
daily application rate and seasonal groundwater application below this point.
For lower well capacities, the farmer reduces the proportion of irrigated acres
to keep maximum daily application rate at kmin. As a result, per acre ap-
plication rate remains fixed at umin below Xs. Xs(µ, σ, , Y ) depends on the
crop’s sensitivity to seasonal and daily water availability, cost of pumping,
and climate. A change in any of the factors can affect the switching point.
Existence of the switching point has several implications. First, there ex-
ists a well capacity below which a profit-maximizing farmer does not further
deficit irrigate below umin with changes in well capacity. This is in contrast
to many of the existing literature that do not consider instantaneous ground-
water availability as a limitation on production. While the model presented
in this chapter is not dynamic, this result can suggest that the response to
lower aquifer levels is not always further deficit irrigation. Farmers can ad-
just irrigated acres as a response to lower saturated thicknesses due to limited
daily groundwater availability.
The results also suggest that it is important to consider heterogeneity
among farmers in terms of daily groundwater availability due to nonlinearity
of the effects of groundwater availability on water use and profits. While
the difference in water consumption and profits can be small for high ca-
pacity wells, it can be significant for low capacity wells because for a profit-
maximizing farmer a low capacity well can irrigate fewer acres compared to
high capacity wells.
Finally, our results have implications for water rights allocation policies.
While these policies can affect higher capacity wells, they may not affect low
capacity wells since farmers with low capacity wells adjust their irrigated
acres and water consumption decreases significantly. This might be one pos-
sible explanation for why water allocation policies in west Kansas are not a
binding constraint for many farmers. For example, in studying the signifi-
cance of pumping externalities in western Kansas, (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012)
used a farmer’s neighboring permit amount as an instrumental variable for
determining their pumping quantity. They showed that while the pumping
permit is a strong predictor of the amount of groundwater pumped, there is
not a one-to-one relationship between them and a one acre-foot increase in
permit amount results in 0.3 acre-feet increase in quantity pumped.
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While our results show that with lower well capacities groundwater extrac-
tion decreases, one concern is whether lower well capacities could result in
more water application during the growing season because a farmer is not
able to meet crop water demand during the critical stages of the growing
season. However, in practice this is not the case because crop canopy is not
completely developed at the beginning of the season. More water application
in this stage could result in larger soil evaporation which is non-beneficial.
Together, Propositions 1 to 3 show the profit-maximizing levels of irrigated
acres (extensive margin) and per acre application rate (intensive margin)
over the domain of well capacity X ∈ [0,∞). Unlimited capacity or some
variations of it are the cases considered within the existing economics liter-
ature. Comparing Propositions 2 and 3 to Proposition 1, we can conclude
that instantaneous groundwater availability can affect irrigation decisions
and profits non-linearly. These results also provide us with a tractable ana-
lytical solution so that we can derive comparative statics. Even though the
framework is static these results can provide insight and the basis for dy-
namic analysis. The results suggest that looking at a cross section of data,
controlling for other factors, we expect larger irrigated acres and small differ-
ences in per acre water application among farms with large well capacities,
and variation in the proportion of acres irrigated among low capacity wells.
In proposition 3, I showed that there exists a switching well capacity. The
next proposition makes this claim stronger by providing the conditions that
we might observe a switching point in irrigation decisions. In order to do so,
I define sensitivity to daily water availability as the effect of a change in per
acre maximum daily water availability on crop yield. For a given weather,
crop j is defined to be more sensitive to daily water availability than crop i if
a decrease in per acre maximum daily water availability affects yield of crop
j more severely than crop i. Mathematically, Gj(.) has a larger curvature
than Gi(.). A crop is not sensitive to daily water availability if a decrease in
maximum daily application rate per acre does not affect crop yield, i.e. G(.)
is constant.
Proposition 4. Under two conditions we may observe a switching point:
(a) when a crop is sensitive to daily water availability; (b) when total seasonal
water availability constraint binds.
Condition (a) of Proposition 4 can be thought of as a corollary to Propo-
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sition 3. If G(
X
A
, ) is not constant, i.e. if daily water availability affects
crop yield, a switching point exists. However, the opposite is not necessarily
true, i.e. a switching point can exist when a crop is not sensitive to daily
water availability. This can happen when the total seasonal water availabil-
ity constraint binds which is the claim (b) of proposition 4. Proposition 4(b)
is similar to what Wang and Nair (2013) show in their paper. They show
that there exists a similar switching point when total seasonal water avail-
ability is limiting. Their results can be considered a special case of the model
studied in this paper when the crop is insensitive to daily water availability.
Proposition 4 also explains that models that do not consider sensitivity to
daily water availability or limited seasonal water availability do not find a
switching point. This is a theoretical proposition that shows the results of
the model are general and previous models are special cases of the current
model. In practice, daily water availability does affect crop yield. How-
ever, even when a crop is sensitive to daily water availability, total seasonal
groundwater availability might still become the binding constraint and af-
fect the switching point rather than daily water availability. Proposition 5
provides the condition that seasonal water availability can be binding.
Proposition 5. There exists a sensitivity to daily water availability, G¯,
above which total seasonal water availability does not bind.
As well capacity decreases from infinity, both total seasonal water availabil-
ity, h(X), and maximum daily water availability,
X
A
, decrease. Proposition
5 claims that when crop sensitivity to daily water availability is low, for low
well capacities, total seasonal water availability will affect irrigation decisions
rather than daily groundwater availability. On the other hand, if the crop
is “sensitive enough” to daily groundwater availability, the maximum daily
application rate per acre will affect the decision. This result makes intuitive
sense. If crop yield does not decrease significantly as a result of a decline in
maximum daily water available per acre and we can reallocate water from the
critical stages of the growing season without any penalty, we reach a point
where the seasonal water availability constraint becomes binding. However,
in most cases in practice, we expect the daily groundwater availability to
affect the switching point rather than seasonal availability. For example, the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recommends a daily water appli-
cation of 0.24 inches per day (6.1 mm/day), and a seasonal water demand of
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19.685 to 31.5 inches (500 to 800 mm) with a growing season of 125 to 180
days for corn. If we divide 25.6 inches by 152.5 days (their average values),
we get 0.168 inches per day. This suggests that the effect of daily water
availability is higher than seasonal availability. For citrus, however, the daily
water demand is 0.15 inches/day (3.85 mm/day) with a growing season of
240 to 365 days and total water demand of 35.4 to 47.24 inches (900-1200
mm). Diving 41.32 inches by 302.5 days, we get 0.168 inches per day. Unlike
corn, for citrus seasonal water availability might be the constraint.
In theory, G¯, defines a sensitivity to daily water availability above which
we do not expect to see total seasonal water availability to affect switching
point. Since in practice we expect most crops to be more sensitive than G¯,
we ignore the constraint on total seasonal water availability.
3.4 An Illustrative Example
In order to depict Propositions 1 to 3, a production function was generated by
calibrating the production function introduced in section 3.3 to production
functions generated by AQUACROP-OS (Foster et al., 2017), an open source
crop simulation model, for corn production in Chase County, Nebraska. The
parameters used in this study are provided in table 3.1. We assume that the
maximum irrigable land is 130 acres which is the size of a quarter-section
center-pivot circle. We also consider a fixed cost for production. The fixed
cost is not considered in equation 3.1, but is considered here to provide
realistic solutions and does not affect the intuition behind Propositions 1-3.
Results are shown in figure 3.2.
We can see that the switching point, considered for Chase County is 28
acre-inches per day or ≈ 530 gallons per minute under current climate condi-
tions. The figures show that above the switching point, a profit-maximizing
farmer will irrigate their entire parcel (130 acres), while below the switch-
ing point they will adjust irrigated acres linearly keeping expected irrigation
depth at 16.4 inches. Finally, we can see that heterogeneity in water con-
sumption and profits are smaller above the switching point. Comparing fig-
ures 3.2c and 3.2d, we can see that above the switching point even though the
application depth does not decrease significantly, profits decline rapidly due
to limited groundwater availability during the critical stages of the growing
60
season. We further show the importance of the findings of Propositions 1 to 3,
by examining the implications of the heterogeneity in access to instantaneous
groundwater supply on irrigation decisions and profits.
3.4.1 Effects of an Increase in Pumping Cost
In this section we study the effects of an increase in pumping cost on irri-
gation decisions. Since the focus in this paper is on the effect of instanta-
neous groundwater availability on irrigation decisions and profits, we keep the
pumping cost fixed over the domain of well capacity. The analytical analysis,
which is provided in Appendix B, focuses on the effect of a marginal change
in the cost of pumping on the profit maximizing amount of water applied
per acre and the switching point, while the numerical results also include the
changes in total water demand across well capacities.
The analytical results show that an increase in pumping cost will decrease
water consumption for every well capacity, and will shift the switching point
to a higher well capacity. This result suggests that while high capacity wells
adjust on the intensive margin as a result of an increase in pumping cost,
medium and lower well capacities (well capacities below 30 acre-inches per
day) adjust on both the intensive and extensive margins. Specifically, some
range of wells above the switching point will not irrigate their entire parcel
any more as a result of an increase in pumping cost. The range of well ca-
pacities affected depends on the size of the increase in pumping cost . The
higher the cost the more farmers will be affected. These results are shown
graphically in Figure 3.3. Figures 3.3a and 3.3b show that a $1 increase in
cost of pumping shifts the switching point from 28 to 29.2 acre-inches per
day. Under this price change wells below 29.2 acre-inches per day reduce both
irrigated acres and irrigation depth, while wells above this well capacity only
adjust their irrigation depth. As can be seen in figure 3.3c, the size of the
decrease in seasonal water use is the highest among a range of well capacities
near the switching point. This finding is important in studying price elastic-
ity of demand. The results suggest that changes in water consumption are
not monotonic across well capacities. Well capacities close to the switching
point have the largest response to changes in the cost of water because they
adjust both on the extensive and intensive margins. This result suggests
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that when considering water pricing policies, regulators should consider the
heterogeneous effects of such policies. We will further explore this in Section
3.4.3. The result also suggests that assuming a homogenous response or a
representative farmer may not be a valid assumption when studying price
elasticity of demand. Empirical models should control for the range of well
capacities.
Finally, Figure 3.3c also suggest that even though the price elasticity of
water demand is very small for low well capacities, it is not zero. This is in
contrast to the case where total seasonal water availability is a constraint for
production. In the case of a seasonal limit, price elasticity of demand will
be zero for the constrained portion of well capacities (Wang and Nair, 2013).
However, results of this section show that even for very low well capacities
price elasticity is not zero analytically.
3.4.2 Effects of a Change in Climate Conditions
Heterogeneity in groundwater availability is also important for studying the
effects of climatic changes on irrigated agriculture. Climatic changes could
result in changes in seasonal and intra-seasonal water availability in terms of
precipitation and surface flows. Recent studies (e.g. Fishman (2011)) show
that not only seasonal water availability affects irrigation decisions, intra-
seasonal variations are also important for irrigation decisions and profits.
In this model, drier climate conditions affect irrigation revenue through
. In reality, climate has two distinct effects on crop production. First, in a
drier climate, expected seasonal water application should be higher to achieve
higher expected crop yields. Second, in a drier climate, average daily water
availability, particularly during the critical stages of the growing season and
in form of average soil moisture, decreases. As a result, in a drier climate,
at any level of maximum daily application rate, expected crop yield is lower.
This difference becomes smaller for higher maximum daily application rates
since the farmer can buffer for dry conditions at the critical stages of the
growing season with higher application rates. In general, a drier climate can
be thought of as a combination of seasonal and intra-seasonal effects on crop
yield.
The results show that the effect of drier conditions (i.e. an increase in
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) on profit-maximizing decisions is complex. Analytical results are shown
in Appendix B and graphical results using the numerical analysis of the
characteristics of Chase County are shown in Figure 3.4. Based on the results
of Section 3.3, we know that a farmer with high well capacity can meet
the daily crop water demand during the growing season in dry years by
applying more water. Thus, in a drier climate, the farmer applies more
water than in the current climate, while they apply less water in a wetter
climate. With intermediate and lower well capacities, however, the farmer
needs to adjust their irrigated acres to provide higher instantaneous irrigation
capacity to be able to meet the higher demand during the critical stages
of the growing season in drier climates. Figure 3.4a shows that intensive
margin application increases for every well capacity as the climate gets drier.
Figure 3.4b shows changes in expected seasonal groundwater application as a
function of changes in climatic conditions. We can see that in a drier climate,
expected seasonal application is higher for a farmer with high well capacity,
while the expected seasonal application is lower for a farmer with low well
capacity.
As we can see, the reduction in water consumption is largest for intermedi-
ate well capacities near the switching point. These results suggest that the ef-
fect of future climatic changes among farmers may be more complex than pre-
viously thought. While farmers with higher well capacities can buffer against
the drier climatic conditions, farmers with lower capacities may not have the
same capability. This issue can be even more significant if aquifer levels keep
declining and well capacities further decrease with decline in aquifer levels.
These results also suggest that the effects of changes in climatic conditions
are neither homogenous nor linear across farmers with different access to
instantaneous groundwater supply. This is in contrast to the studies that
do not consider intra-seasonal groundwater availability as a limiting factor
for irrigated agriculture (e.g. Tsur (1990)). In these models, any farmer can
meet crop water demand in drier climates. Taking into account the effect of
well capacity limitations is thus important in understanding the buffer value
that an aquifer can provide. Finally, Figure 3.4c shows the effect of changes in
climate on profits. The effect of a drier climates on profit is non-monotonic,
and it is highest among intermediate well capacities which suggests that
farmers with intermediate well capacities may be the most vulnerable, in
terms of potential reductions in profits, to future climatic changes.
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3.4.3 Welfare Effects of Aquifer Stabilization Policies
An important application of the model developed in this paper is in under-
standing the cost-effectiveness and welfare effects of different policies that in-
tend to reduce groundwater extraction. With aquifer levels rapidly declining,
there is significant demand from farmers and policy makers to reduce ground-
water extraction from irrigated agriculture to either stabilize the aquifer in
areas with higher recharge or extend the economic life of the aquifer in areas
of lower recharge. Most existing policies are uniform across space (Guilfoos
et al., 2016) and do not change significantly over time. Existing literature
often does not consider heterogeneity among farmers in terms of access to
instantaneous groundwater supply in their analysis of different policies. In
this section, I study four different policies for reducing groundwater extrac-
tion and compare them in terms of cost-effectiveness and their heterogenous
distributional effects among farmers.
The focus of this section is on the Upper Republican Natural Resources
District (URNRD) in southwest Nebraska. The district is within the Re-
publican River Basin which is one of the most highly regulated areas in the
High Plains Aquifer with significant interest among local water managers to
protect the Republican River from the impacts of pumping. There are 3333
active agricultural wells between 5.3 and 80 acre-inches per day capacity (100
and 1509 gallons per minute respectively) in the basin. Well capacity data at
the time the well were drilled was obtained from the Nebraska Department
of Nebraska well database. They were then adjusted to actual well capac-
ities using the equation provided in (Koester, 2004). Figure 3.5 shows the
distribution of well capacities in the District. The average well capacity for
the URNRD is 47.5 acre-inches per day which is above the switching point
of 28 acre-inches per day derived in Section 3.3. The standard deviation of
well capacities is 13.14 acre-inches per day. As we can see, there are not
many wells below the switching point in the URNRD for current climatic
conditions.
We consider four policies to reduce consumption. First, taxing a unit of
water, i.e. a pumping tax. Current rules in the URNRD mandate new wells
to have an approved flow meter installed on wells. Second, taxing an acre
of irrigated land which is called an occupation tax in Nebraska and was set
at $10 per irrigated acre in 2007 (Aiken, 2012). Third, limiting irrigated
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acres homogeneously across farmers assuming a 130 acre irrigated parcel
which is the area of a quarter section center-pivot circle. I call this policy
“percent irrigated acres”. This policy assumes every farmer owning a well
can irrigate 130 acres of land and bases the reduction in consumptive use
on this assumption. Finally, a policy that reduces irrigated acres based on
the currently certified acres of farmers. This policy assumes that the initial
number of certified acres is the profit maximizing number of irrigated acres
for each farmer. We obtain the profit maximizing quantity of irrigated acres
by solving equation 3.1 for each farmer. This policy, although similar to
the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) in that it targets
irrigated acres, does not intend to retire the entire parcel for some farmers,
but rather intends to reduce the same proportion of irrigated acres across
all farmers. Since we are interested in cost-effectiveness of these policies
(as well as distributional effects), we assume that the amount paid in taxes
could be returned to the farmers in some way. In this way, we only compare
the policies based on their effect on profits due to reduction in groundwater
extraction rather than a combination of changes in productivity and taxes
(Hendricks and Peterson, 2012).
Figure 3.6a shows the decrease in profits as a function of a decrease in
the level of water consumption for different policies. The decrease in water
consumption and profit occurs due to “tighter” policies. We can see that the
pumping tax is the cost-effective policy among the four policies proposed.
We also note that the ranking of the policies remains the same for different
levels of reduction in groundwater extraction suggesting that the pumping tax
could provide the highest savings for any level of reduction target given that
all pumps are required to install flow meters. Among the three land-based
policies, while an acreage tax is the most cost-effective policy, these three
policies are very similar in terms of cost-effectiveness. This similarity suggests
that the assumption on the number of irrigated acres by policymakers may
not have a significant effect on the savings of the policy. Policymakers can
assume homogenous irrigated acres across farmers.
Cost-effectiveness is not the only consideration for aquifer management
policies, but welfare effects are also important. Guilfoos et al. (2016) mention
two main reasons for the importance of distributional effects of different
policies. First, policies with a negative effect on many farmers may not be
implementable. Second, given that most policies are simplified to be uniform
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across space and time, it is important to understand their effects on farmers
that are located within a heterogenous aquifer. I study this case by adding
well capacity as a source of heterogeneity among farmers and look at the
distributional effects. Specifically, I look at the distribution of water use and
profits for the proposed policies. The results are shown in Figures 3.6b and
3.6c. These two figures show the distribution of water consumption and profit
for 20% reduction in extraction from the case of no policy. This reduction is
shown with a dashed-line in Figure 3.6a.
In each graph, we can compare the outcomes under different policies with
a status-quo with no policy. The results show that different policies affect
farmers with different well capacities differently both in terms of water con-
sumption and in terms of profits. From Figure 3.6b, we can see that under
an occupation tax, most of the reduction comes from the intermediate and
low capacity wells, while the three other policies reduce groundwater extrac-
tion mainly from intermediate and high capacity wells. The policy based
on the proportion of 130 acres does not affect groundwater extraction for
low capacity wells. This makes sense since the farmers have already ad-
justed their irrigated acres and pump less groundwater as a result. The
cost-effective policy, the pumping tax, will also result in reduction in extrac-
tion from higher capacity wells. This finding shows that the distribution of
reduction in groundwater extraction under taxing policies is different. Under
a pumping tax, the reduction in extraction mainly comes from farmers with
intermediate and high capacity wells, while under an acreage tax, most of
the reduction comes from farmers with intermediate and low capacity wells.
From a policy perspective, if there are regions within the aquifer that have
lower saturated thickness and as a result lower well capacities, an acreage tax
can result in larger reduction in extraction in these areas which can extend
the “local” life of the aquifer. This can be particularly important in cases
where lateral flow of the aquifer or the recharge rate is slower than the ex-
traction rate, or in the cases where there is significant spatial heterogeneity
in aquifer characteristics. Local aquifer levels are important because negative
pumping and stock externalities can be important in local low well capacity
areas.
The aforementioned results make more sense when we look at Figure 3.6c
that shows the distribution of profits. We can see that the reason the pump-
ing tax is the cost-effective policy in this case is because it results in large
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reductions in water consumption, mainly among farmers with high capacity
wells, with relatively small reductions in profit. An acreage tax, on the other
hand, results in larger profit reductions among farmers with low capacity
wells. The two policies that target reducing number of irrigated acres by im-
posing limitations on the number of irrigated acres result in large reductions
in profit among farmers with high capacity wells but do not significantly af-
fect the profits for farmers with lower capacity wells. This is important for
understanding the distributional effects of different policies. From a policy
perspective, if low well capacities are a result of local physical aquifer char-
acteristics other than saturated thickness, an acreage tax may put a higher
burden on farmers with low well capacities that have lower productivity. On
the other hand, if the local low well capacities are due to low aquifer levels,
an acreage tax may be the preferred policy.
Changes in water use depicted in Figure 3.6b also provide some insight
about the performance of a potential groundwater market. For example, a
market with a cap set at 80% of current extraction rates, under the assump-
tion of no transaction costs, will reach the same allocation at the equilibrium
as the tax values in Figure 3.6b. Figure 3.6b suggests that for a groundwater
market where groundwater rights are defined based on the quantity of wa-
ter extracted, if the permits are allocated equally among farmers, we expect
farmers with high capacity wells to be the buyers and farmers with low ca-
pacity wells to be the sellers. On the other hand, if the groundwater permits
are defined based on the number of acres irrigated, we expect farmers with
high capacity wells and farmers with low capacity wells to be the sellers, and
farmers with intermediate well capacity to be the buyers in the market. This
information can be very useful in understanding the ex-ante performance of
markets. Policymakers should pay attention to the distribution of the wells
and the type and distribution of groundwater rights within the district in
determining whether a groundwater market can be an appropriate choice.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I studied the effects of instantaneous groundwater availabil-
ity on irrigation decisions and profit of a profit-maximizing farmer. The
existing economics literature assumes an abundant instantaneous supply of
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groundwater from aquifers. However, agronomic and engineering literatures
show that instantaneous groundwater availability is a major factor affecting
crop production and it is important to meet crop water demand during the
critical stages of the growing season. This paper captures these observa-
tions within the decision making framework of a profit-maximizing farmer.
The results of the analytical model show that instantaneous groundwater
availability does affect irrigation decisions. Specifically, there exists a well
capacity (the switching point) below which a profit maximizing farmer will
not irrigate their entire parcel, but reduces irrigated acres instead to provide
enough capacity to meet crop water demand during the critical stages of the
growing season. As a result, water consumption and profits are significantly
lower for well capacities below the switching point.
The analytical findings have important policy implications. The results
suggest that farmers with well capacities slightly above the switching point
are the most affected by water pricing policies because such policies affect
their decisions both at the intensive and extensive margins. This suggests
that price elasticity of demand for groundwater is non-monotonic across well
capacities, where a medium range of well capacities has the highest response
to an increase in the price of water. Results suggest that policymakers should
consider the distribution of wells when considering a water pricing policy.
The results can also have implications for the effect of energy policies on
irrigation decisions. I also show that farmers with intermediate well capacities
can be the most vulnerable to dry weather conditions, which has important
implications for the effect of climate change on irrigated agriculture. Climatic
changes are expected to affect both seasonal water availability and the intra-
seasonal distribution of rainfall. Results of this study suggest that while drier
climatic conditions affect all farmers with different well capacities, the effects,
in terms of profit, are most severe among intermediate well capacities. From
a policy perspective, we should note that with further extraction from the
aquifers, well capacities are expected to decline. In regions currently with
many wells with high well capacities, this distribution may shift towards lower
well capacities. A larger number of wells with intermediate well capacities
could mean larger impacts from future climatic changes.
Furthermore, I find that overlooking the effect of instantaneous groundwa-
ter availability on irrigation decisions through its effects on crop yield could
result in miscalculating the effectiveness of groundwater policies. Existing
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models assume a uniform response among different types of farmers and a
homogenous demand function. For example Feinerman and Knapp (1983)
compare the effect of a pumping tax and an acreage tax on pumpers but
do not consider instantaneous groundwater availability as a source of hetero-
geneity. Results of my study suggest that since it is important to consider
both cost-effectiveness and who the policy intends to target to reduce ground-
water extraction, policy makers should take into account that farmers with
different well capacities respond differently to different policies.
Moreover, efficiency and cost effectiveness is the focus of most groundwater
management policies but distributional effects have not received much atten-
tion. Equity both within and across generations is an important concern for
the public interest (Peterson et al., 2003). The results show that farmers
with different well capacities respond differently to different water policies
and the effects on their profits are also different. This finding is important
in understanding the effect of aquifer management policies across farmers
in aquifers with heterogenous physical characteristics. For example Peter-
son et al. (2003) argue that the bedrock of the High Plains Aquifer is very
unequal between farmers. Results of this study suggest that even though a
pumping tax is a cost effective policy, an acreage tax could be preferred if
maintaining local parts of an aquifer is a priority.
Furthermore, the buffer value of an aquifer is not the focus of this study,
Our results suggest that the buffer value of an aquifer against dry weather
conditions depends on saturated thickness suggesting that the literature that
do not consider instantaneous groundwater availability (Tsur, 1990; Gemma
and Tsur, 2007) may provide biased results for buffer value of aquifer, i.e.
they may overestimate the buffer value of aquifer when saturated thickness is
low and thus underestimating the value of aquifer management when buffer
value of aquifer is still high. Future research should study buffer value of the
aquifer considering well capacity in more depth.
Provencher and Burt (1993) argue that three types of pumping external-
ities exist: a stock externality which is a reduction in the stock of available
groundwater for future pumping, a pumping cost externality which is the
increase in cost of pumping due to pumping groundwater, and a risk exter-
nality which reduces the buffer value of aquifer against income risk. Our
results suggest that there exists a well capacity externality that reduces ex-
pected profits of neighboring farmers during the life aquifer by reducing their
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well capacities. Future research could further investigate these claims using a
spatial model and considering the effect of instantaneous groundwater avail-
ability on crop yield and the effect of saturated thickness on well capacity.
Finally, even though this study does not include a dynamic model, its re-
sults can provide insight into the temporal and spatial benefits of aquifer
management. Our results are important for temporal value of aquifer man-
agement when we consider that as aquifer levels decline, well capacities also
decline (Brookfield, 2016; Hecox et al., 2002). The results suggest that an
increase in pumping cost is not the only effect on irrigation decisions, and
that the demand function throughout the life of the aquifer will not be the
same as assumed in earlier models such as Gisser and Sanchez (1980), but
will be nonlinear. Also, the decline in well capacity means that the future
distribution of well capacities may not be the same. As a result the distribu-
tion of profits within the aquifer management district or basin could change
over time. Future research could study the changes in distribution of well
capacities on the effectiveness of aquifer management policies using dynamic
models.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Parameter values used in profit maximization
parameter Value
Price of corn per bushel ($) 4.15
Cost of pumping a gallon of groundwater ($) 2.17
Maximum attainable corn yield (bushels) 219.2
Fixed costs ($ per acre) 400
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Figure 3.2: Profit-maximizing levels of a) irrigated acres b) irrigation
depth, c) maximum profits, and d) seasonal water use under different levels
of instantaneous groundwater availability (well capacity). The dashed-line
shows the switching point above which the decision is to adjust irrigation
depth and below which the profit-maximizing decision is to adjust the
number of acres irrigated.
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Figure 3.3: Figures a) and b) show irrigation depth and seasonal water
application for a 130-acre field as a function of well capacity for different
pumping costs. As pumping cost increases, both irrigation depth and total
water application decrease, while the switching point shifts to the right.
Panel c) shows the effect of a $1 increase in cost of pumping on water
application at $2.17 and $3.17. We can see that the effect is non-monotonic.
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Figure 3.4: Effects of changes in climate, , on a) irrigation depth, b)
seasonal water use, and c) profit. As  increases, the switching point shifts
to the right. We can also see a non-monotonic change in seasonal water use
and profit from an increase in .
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of well capacities in the Upper Republican Natural
Resources District, Nebraska
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Figure 3.6: Panel a) shows the loss of profit as a result of reducing water
use for each policy. Panels b) and c) show changes in water use and profit
for profit-maximizing farmers with different well capacities for each policy
set to reduce total extraction in the District by 20%.
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CHAPTER 4
LOSS OF BUFFER VALUE DUE TO
AQUIFER DEPLETION: THE CASE OF
THE NORTHERN HIGH PLAINS AQUIFER
4.1 Introduction
Aquifers serve both as a source of water supply to increase crop yield and to
buffer against the variability of precipitation and surface water flows during a
crop growing season. Most existing studies have focused on the former, while
the role of an aquifer in buffering against the variations of weather during a
growing season is significantly understudied within the economics literature.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I showed that groundwater avail-
ability during the growing season can significantly affect irrigation decisions
and profits of agricultural production. In this chapter, I build on the frame-
work developed in chapter 3 to study the loss of buffer value of aquifer due
to aquifer depletion. I then apply the methodology to the case study of the
northern portion of the High Plains Aquifer which includes parts of Nebraska
and Kansas to estimate the loss of buffer value between 1980 and 2009.
Groundwater has been a major factor in increasing agricultural produc-
tion over the past decades. Increasing extraction rates that exceed natural
recharge rates have resulted in significant declines in aquifer levels raising
concerns about vulnerability of agricultural production to dry weather con-
ditions and droughts. While there is recent evidence on the increasing risks
of agricultural production in the past few years, existing studies have ex-
plained it as a result of changes in management practices such as increasing
density of planted crops (Lobell et al., 2014), and an increase in the num-
ber of irrigated acres and switching to water intensive crops (Hornbeck and
Keskin, 2014). These studies, however, do not consider the role of aquifer
depletion in increasing variation in crop yields. This is specially important
because under most existing explanations about the role of aquifers, exis-
tence of an aquifer is sufficient for buffering against dry weather conditions.
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Recent studies, however, show that instantaneous groundwater availability
during the growing season matters for farmers’ irrigation decisions (Foster
et al., 2014) and for their ability to buffer against drought (Foster et al.,
2015b).
Many of the existing economic studies consider increases in costs of pump-
ing as the channel through which changes in aquifer levels affect irrigation
profits (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Provencher and Burt, 1994; Knapp and Ol-
son, 1995). Others consider the case of catastrophic events, such as saltwater
intrusion as another cost to aquifer depletion. These studies mainly focus on
optimal management of groundwater aquifers under event uncertainty (Tsur
and Zemel, 1995, 2004). In this paper, we explain another channel, namely
loss of buffer value, as a channel through which aquifer depletion can affect
irrigated agriculture.
There has been several economic papers, by Yacov Tsur and his colleagues,
that studied the buffer value of aquifers (Tsur, 1990; Tsur and Graham-
Tomasi, 1991; Gemma and Tsur, 2007) under static and dynamic settings.
In these studies, Tsur and his colleagues find a positive buffer value for
groundwater. However, they consider changes in depth to water as the only
mechanism through which aquifer depletion affects irrigation decisions. They
implicitly assume that at any saturated thickness water is available in unlim-
ited quantities which suggests that a farmer can buffer against dry weather
conditions as long as the marginal cost of pumping is not too high. As a
result of their assumption, production risk translates into cost of pumping
meaning that aquifer depletion results only in higher pumping costs to buffer
against dry weather conditions.
In Chapter 3, I developed a framework that explicitly takes into account
the effects of pumping rates on a profit-maximizing farmer’s irrigation de-
cisions about the number of irrigated acres and application rates per acre.
The results in chapter 3 suggest that aquifer depletion not only affect cost
of pumping, but it can directly affect crop yield. In this chapter, I build on
the model developed in chapter 3 and develop a framework to study the loss
of buffer value of an aquifer. I apply the methodology to estimate the loss
of buffer value within a portion of the High Plains Aquifer consisting of 3
counties in Nebraska and 2 counties in Kansas between 1980 and 2009.
The High Plains Aquifer is one of the major aquifers in the United States,
underlying portions of eight states. The aquifer is an important source of
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water supply for agricultural production, accounting for more than 30% of
groundwater withdrawals from aquifers in the US. It is also an important
source for agricultural-dependent economic activities for the region. Recent
studies have shown a significant decline in groundwater levels in portions of
the aquifer from pre-development levels (McGuire, 2014). Since these declines
in aquifer levels could result in changes in the capacity at which farmers
can extract groundwater (Hecox et al., 2002), they could have significant
implications for agricultural production risk.
The importance of the High Plains Aquifer and rapid rates of depletion
have attracted much attention from policy makers and the scientific commu-
nity about the consequences of the existing extraction rates. Several recent
studies have analyzed changes in levels and storage of the High Plains Aquifer
mainly focusing on the the lifespan of the aquifer based on existing extraction
rates (Steward et al., 2013; Scanlon et al., 2012; Tidwell et al., 2016). These
studies suggest that changes in the storage of the High Plains Aquifer are
very localized and are heterogenous. However, these studies do not explicitly
take into account the effects of aquifer depletion on irrigation decisions and
profits, and while they mention that aquifer depletion has resulted in lower
well capacities, they do not take these changes into account. Thus, existing
studies provide limited insights into the benefits of aquifer management.
In this chapter, I study the loss of buffer value due to aquifer depletion in
Chase, Dundy, and Perkins counties in Nebraska, and Cheyenne and Sherman
counties in Kansas. I find that there is significant variability in the effects
of aquifer depletion on the buffer value of the aquifer within the study area.
While most of the study area has experienced losses estimated at less than
$30 per acre between 1980 and 2009, some parts have experienced losses of
up to $100 per acre. Furthermore, I find that the effect is more significant
in the southern part of Nebraska and the Kansas portion of the study area.
Finally, I find that initial saturated thickness, as well as aquifer depletion are
important determinants of the loss of buffer value.
4.2 Methodology
Engineering studies suggest that as aquifer levels decline, the instantaneous
supply of groundwater from an aquifer decreases (Theis, 1935). The decrease
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in instantaneous groundwater supply is nonlinear such that for high saturated
thickness levels, changes in aquifer level result in small changes in the instan-
taneous supply of groundwater. However, at lower saturated thickness levels,
similar changes in aquifer level can result in much larger reductions in the
instantaneous supply of groundwater from an aquifer. Agronomic studies, on
the other hand, suggest that the instantaneous supply of water during the
growing season is critical for crop growth (Rogers et al., 2015; Schneekloth
et al., 2009; Martin et al., 1984; O’Brien et al., 2001; Lamm, 2004; Lamm
et al., 2007). Together these literatures suggest that there may be conse-
quences to aquifer depletion beyond an increase in pumping cost that have
been ignored within the economics literature and in policy making.
In Chapter 3, I developed a production function, G(
X
A
)(M)Φ(u, µ, σ), that
captures both the inter-seasonal and the intra-seasonal nature of irrigation
demand and decisions. The inter-seasonal part of the production function,
Φ(u, µ, σ), explains the effect of instantaneous groundwater application on
crop yield under current climatic conditions taking into account crop, soil
and technology characteristics. This function is a cumulative distribution
function and provides a solution to the intra-seasonal decisions of a farmer
under stochastic conditions when there are no limitations on instantaneous
groundwater supply.
The inter-seasonal part of the production function, G(
X
A
), takes into ac-
count the effect of well capacity, X, on crop yield through maximum instan-
taneous application rate, (
X
A
), where A is the number of irrigated acres. The
maximum instantaneous application rate is the maximum amount that can
be applied to an acre instantaneously. In practice, this ratio is a proxy for
how well an irrigation system can keep up with soil moisture deficits during
the growing season. The ratio is also a practical value that is used in many
design and irrigation guidelines which makes it a relevant factor within an
irrigation decision framework. The G function suggests that a farmer’s abil-
ity to keep up with soil moisture demand for crop growth during the growing
season depends on maximum application rate per acre which itself depends
on instantaneous amount that can be extracted from the aquifer and the
number of irrigated acres. Since this function captures the effect of allocated
irrigated acres in crop yield, it captures the inter-seasonal nature of irriga-
tion decisions. G is increasing and concave in (
X
A
) suggesting that keeping
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the number of irrigated acres fixed, as the amount of groundwater that can
be extracted from the aquifer, X, decreases, a farmer’s ability to meet crop
water demand during the critical stages of the growing season decreases at
an increasing rate.
In Chapter 3, I used this production function in a framework of a profit-
maximizing farmer to determine the share of irrigated acres, extensive mar-
gin, groundwater application per acre, intensive margin, and irrigated profits
for a given climate. The results in the previous chapter showed that a de-
crease in well capacity could affect irrigation decisions and profit nonlinearly.
In this chapter, I build on the framework introduced in Chapter 3 and add
nonlinearities in the effects of aquifer depletion on instantaneous supply of
groundwater to study the effects of aquifer depletion on loss of buffer value
for irrigated agriculture. In this framework, a risk-neutral farmer maximizes
their expected profit based on groundwater availability, crop, technology and
biophysical characteristics:
Max
A,u
A
{
PG(
X
A
, )(M)Φ(u, µ+ , σ)− Γ(Y )u
}
subject to A ≤ 1
A, u ≥ 0
(4.1)
In equation 4.1, A, number of irrigated acres, and u, expected application
rate per acre, are the decisions variables and while they are determined si-
multaneously in the model, the model captures the two-stage nature of the
decisions. P is the price of the crop, X is well capacity, and µ and σ are
parameters of the production function. Y is saturated thickness, and Γ(Y )
is the marginal cost of pumping groundwater. M is the maximum attainable
yield. G(
X
A
)Φ(u, µ, σ) is expected crop yield per acre.
Instantaneous supply of groundwater is a function of saturated thickness,
which is the saturated portion of the aquifer and is measured as the height of
the groundwater level from the base of the aquifer, as well as physical aquifer
characteristics such as specific yield, which is a measure of the ability of an
aquifer to supply groundwater as a result of pumping. Specifically, changes in
saturated thickness affect instantaneous supply of groundwater nonlinearly
such that
dX
dY
> 0 and
d2X
dY 2
< 0. These changes directly enter into the
farmer’s decision making and affect irrigation profit. I define the change in
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the buffer value of the aquifer from year t to year t− κ as the change in the
(maximized) expected profit due to the change in the capacity of the aquifer
to supply groundwater keeping irrigation cost, prices and climatic conditions
fixed:
Annual change in buffer value between t and t− κ =
(Expected profit|Pt,Γ(Y )t, t)t − (Expected profit|Pt,Γ(Y )t, t)t−κ (4.2)
This definition is different from that of Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991)
and an often commonly understood concept of buffer value in economics
which focuses on risk aversion. In the definition used in this chapter, buffer
value refers to the ability of a (risk-neutral) farmer to meet the intra-seasonal
demand of a crop during the growing season based on the instantaneous sup-
ply and availability of groundwater. In Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991),
changes in buffer value become translated into pumping cost. However, in
the model in this chapter, changes in buffer value directly affects expected
crop yield. This definition captures biophysical characteristics of groundwa-
ter supply and the intra-seasonal nature of irrigation decision making based
on stochastic weather conditions. The framework does not intend to compare
the difference between deterministic and stochastic settings; rather it intends
to introduce a more intuitive definition regarding the effect of aquifer deple-
tion on irrigation decisions of a farmer and their ability to “buffer” against
the intra-seasonal variability of weather. Furthermore, while risk aversion
can be added to this framework, it is not necessary to do so. This is be-
cause changes in aquifer level can also affect the intra-seasonal availability
of groundwater and expected profits for a risk-neutral farmer. In the next
section, I apply this methodology to the case of 5 counties in Nebraska and
Kansas overlying the northern High Plains aquifer.
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4.3 Case Study
4.3.1 Background
The High Plains Aquifer, sometimes called the Ogallala Aquifer, is one of
the largest aquifers in the world, underlying portions of eight states includ-
ing South Dakota, Wyoming, Nebraska, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, New
Mexico and Texas. Among these states, Nebraska, Kansas and Texas overlie
the largest area compared to others.
After the Dust Bowl of the 1930s and World War II, the introduction
of pumps and center pivot irrigation technologies has significantly increased
the share of irrigated agriculture and has changed the economy of the region.
Since then the aquifer has been a major support for the agricultural economy
of the states overlying the High Plains aquifer, making them the breadbasket
of America. Irrigation within the region further intensified during 1980s.
Currently, the aquifer provides more than 30% of groundwater withdrawals
from aquifers in the US (Tidwell et al., 2016).
The intensification of irrigated agriculture, however, resulted in a signif-
icant decline in groundwater levels from pre-development levels in portions
of the aquifer (McGuire, 2014). Since these declines in aquifer levels could
result in declines in the capacity at which farmers can extract groundwater
(Hecox et al., 2002), they could have significant implications for agricultural
production risk. Such effects could specially be important under climatic
changes (Foster et al., 2015b). While the number of irrigated acres and aver-
age irrigated and non-irrigated crop yields have all increased over time, so has
the variance of crop yield, despite advances in crop and irrigation technology.
As a result farmers have engaged in adaptive behaviors such as reducing ir-
rigated acres to lower production risk (Steward et al., 2013). These findings
raise questions about the impact of depletion of the High Plains aquifer on
agricultural production risk, food security and local economies of the region.
A notable point about the High Plains Aquifer is that there is signifi-
cant heterogeneity within the aquifer both in terms of aquifer characteristics,
rainfall and recharge rate (Scanlon et al., 2012; Peterson et al., 2003). This
heterogeneity has resulted in different demand for groundwater across the
regions of the aquifer, and has resulted in different changes in aquifer levels
and heterogenous effects on irrigated agriculture. Ignoring this heterogeneity
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within the High Plains Aquifer can result in biased estimates of the effects
of aquifer depletion on irrigated agriculture.
The northern part of the High Plains Aquifer includes South Dakota, Ne-
braska, Wyoming, Colorado, and Kansas. In this paper, I focus on loss
of buffer value in the parts of the aquifer that overlie 3 counties in Ne-
braska, namely Chase, Dundy and Perkins, and 2 counties in Kansas, namely
Cheyenne and Sherman. These counties are located in southwest Nebraska
and Northwest Kansas (figure 4.1). While this part of the aquifer has expe-
rienced moderate declines in aquifer levels compared to the southern part of
the High Plains aquifer, it is important to study loss of buffer value in this
are because the 3 counties in Nebraska are among the counties that have ex-
perienced the most significant changes in aquifer levels since predevelopment
compared to other counties in Nebraska. Furthermore, comparing the loss
of buffer value across Nebraska and Kansas can provide some insight into
differential changes in buffer values of the aquifer across states.
4.3.2 Data
Well level data for irrigation wells are obtained from two different sources. To
obtain well level data for Nebraska, I used Nebraska well database from the
Nebraska Department of Natural Resources1. I collected well level data for
the state of Kansas from the water well completion records (WWC5) database
of the Kansas Geological Survey2. Both of the datasets include well depth,
depth to water and pump rate estimates from pumping tests carried out by
the drilling companies and reported in the “drillers log”. Each individual
needs to submit results of their pumping test when they register their wells
to the respective agency in their state.
To estimate saturated thickness of the aquifer in 1980 and 2009, I used
the results of the study by McGuire et al. (2012). They provide raster maps
of saturated thickness for the entire High Plains aquifer for 2009 and raster
maps of changes in aquifer level from 2005 to 2009, from 2000 to to 2005,
from 1995 to 2000, and from 1980 to 1995. I combined all these maps to
attain saturated thickness in 1980. I further use groundwater level data from
the High Plains Aquifer Water-Level Monitoring Study of the US Geological
1http://dnr.nebraska.gov/groundwater-data
2http://www.kgs.ku.edu/Magellan/WaterWell/
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Survey3. This dataset includes time series of static water levels at monitoring
well stations across the High Plains Aquifer. The observations are collected
after the growing season when the groundwater levels are stabilized. This
dataset is used to estimate total depth of the aquifer and saturated thickness
at different years.
McGuire et al. (2012) also provide a map of specific yield for the northern
High Plains Aquifer. I use the data in this map to help determine the effect
of saturated thickness on capacity of irrigation wells. Finally, I use county
level data on agricultural production from the National Agricultural Statis-
tics Survey of the US Department of Agriculture4 in order to calibrate the
production function for each county. This dataset includes an estimated irri-
gated yield for each county in each year. The calibration method is explained
in the next section.
4.3.3 Effect of Changes in Saturated Thickness on Well
Capacity
In order to estimate changes in buffer value between 1980 and 2009, the
effect of changes in saturated thickness on well capacity is first estimated.
This way, we can explicitly account for changes in well capacity as a result
of aquifer depletion over time. To find this relationship, I take advantage of
the well level data for irrigation wells at the time the wells were constructed.
Individuals are required to submit the results of their well tests at the time of
registration. The information submitted includes depth to water table and
pump rate of the well. Since this information is submitted at the time of
construction, it is exogenous to the farmer’s decisions and only reflects the
relationship between aquifer characteristics. Since this is a physical relation-
ship and should not depend on a specific location, I use well level records
between 1995 and 2016 in Nebraska and Kansas to estimate the relationship.
We are interested in the relationship between well capacity and saturated
thickness. The data submitted by individuals, however, does not include
saturated thickness and only includes depth to water table. Thus saturated
thickness for each irrigation well is estimated through several steps. First,
using saturated thickness data available for 2009 and depth to water reported
3http://ne.water.usgs.gov/ogw/hpwlms/data.html
4https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/
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for USGS monitoring wells, I estimate the depth of base of the aquifer from
the land surface using the following simple formula:
depth of bedrock from surface = depth to water table+saturated thickness.
(4.3)
This relationship provides us with depth to bedrock at the location of every
monitoring well. Next, by matching each irrigation well with the closest
monitoring well, total depth for each irrigation well is estimated. Here, the
assumption is that depth of bedrock is the same for the irrigation well5.
Finally, saturated thickness is estimated by subtracting depth to water table
for irrigation wells from their total depth.
The relationship between saturated thickness and well capacity also de-
pends on physical aquifer characteristics such as specific yield. Specific yield
is a measure of how much water can be extracted from an aquifer with a unit
decline in water table. Thus, we also use specific yield as an independent
variable for determining the relationship between pump rate and saturated
thickness for each irrigation well. Furthermore, changes in well construction
technology and pumping test methods and technology over time can affect
the relationship between saturated thickness and well capacity. To control
for these changes over time, we use time dummies in the regression. Finally,
it is important to notice that the relationship between well capacity and sat-
urated thickness is nonlinear as shown by Hecox et al. (2002). In order to
capture this nonlinear relationship, I use the log-form of saturated thickness
in the regression. The log form can capture that changes in saturated thick-
ness can have differential effects on well capacity depending on the aquifer
level.
The results of the regression are presented in table 4.2. As we can see, the
relationship between saturated thickness and well capacity is nonlinear, such
that a one percent decrease in saturated thickness results in a reduction of
about 75 gallons per minute in well capacity. Furthermore, the coefficient
on specific yield follows our expectations so that with higher specific yields,
well capacity is higher.
5We drop irrigation wells that do not have a monitoring well within a12 mile radius.
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4.3.4 Changes in Buffer Value
Figure 4.2 shows saturated thicknesses of the aquifer for the study area in
1980, 2009 and the change in saturated thickness between these two years.
Declines in aquifer levels are between 0 and 40 feet. Most of the changes in
aquifer levels have taken place in portions of the aquifer with higher saturated
thickness where we might expect smaller reductions in the buffer value of
aquifer.
Using the regression results presented in Table 4.2, well capacity for sat-
urated thickness at the levels of 1980 and 2009 for each point (pixel) in the
5 counties of the case study is predicted6. Figure 4.3 shows the changes in
well capacity as a result of changes in saturated thickness between 1980 and
2009. As we can see, most of the study area has experienced declines in well
capacity in the region of 110 to 130 gallons per minute, while some regions
within the study area have experienced larger declines.
In order to estimate the changes in buffer value, the production function
was calibrated for each county by adjusting M in equation 4.1. To do this, I
developed a ratio for each county based on maximum crop yield reported in
the NASS dataset between 1980 and 2015, compared to that of Chase County.
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the ratio across counties. Maximum
attainable crop yield for each county was then estimated by multiplying this
ratio by 219 bushels per acre, which is the maximum attainable crop yield in
Chase County in Nebraska. Since study counties are along the same latitude,
it is assumed that evapotranspiration rates and thus demand for water is the
same within the study area. Furthermore, as we can see from Table 4.1,
the maximum attainable yields are very close, which can suggest similar
production conditions and characteristics among the counties.
Furthermore, well capacities provided as a result of pumping test do not
estimate actual pumping capacities during the growing season. This is be-
cause the duration of pumping tests is much smaller than actual pumping
during the growing season. Thus, well capacities were adjusted using the
method provided by Koester (2004) to reflect the actual pumping rates dur-
ing the growing season rather than initially reported well capacity from the
pumping test.
Finally, maximum expected profits were estimated for each point of the
6There is a total of 55,000 pixels on the map.
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study area using calibrated production functions (equation 4.1), predicted
well capacities, weather distribution and corn prices of $4.15 for 1980 and
2009 keeping everything other than well capacity fixed. A hypothetical 130-
acre parcel, which is the area of a quarter-section center pivot system, is
assumed at each point to estimate the expected profit for each year. I then
subtract maximum expected profits of 1980 from those of 2009 and divide
the value by 130 to estimate the loss of buffer value per acre and per year
for each point in the study area.
4.4 Results
The results are provided in Figure 4.4 as the annual change in the expected
profits per acre for a 130-acre farm in 2009 dollars. These changes are only
due to changes in instantaneous groundwater availability keeping the distri-
bution of weather, prices and depth to water fixed for 1980 and 2009 scenar-
ios. This way, I can compare the conditions of 2009 to the counterfactual
world where well capacities were maintained at the levels of 1980.
The results show that the Nebraska portion of the study area has experi-
enced moderate changes in buffer value per acre, while the two counties in
Kansas have experienced larger decreases in their buffer value. The average
annual change in buffer value of the Nebraska portion of the study area has
been $25 per acre. The highest decrease in buffer value is estimated to be $57
per acre. While average annual decline in the Kansas portion of the aquifer
is estimated to be around $31 per acre, some portions of Sherman County
have experienced losses of up to $100 per acre. To put these estimates in
perspective, assuming a corn production of 170 bushels per acre, revenue
from an acre of corn is estimated to be $680 per acre. Furthermore, Table
4.3 provides the estimated annual loss of buffer value for each county along
with the rental value of irrigated land. We can see that Chase County has
experienced a 15% reduction in buffer value per acre, while Cheyenne County
has experienced a 30% reduction in buffer value per acre due to aquifer de-
pletion. The total annual loss of buffer value for the study area as a result
of aquifer depletion between 1980 and 2009 is estimated to be around $10.6
million in 2009 if the aquifer levels were maintained at the levels of 1980.
In order to understand the importance of these results, we can compare
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them to the effects of changes in the cost of pumping on irrigation profit per
acre. Based on the assumptions of 50 feet of irrigation depth, 40 psi pressure
at the pump, using a center pivot system, and a price of $1.66 per gallon of
diesel, the cost of applying an acre-inch of groundwater is estimated to be
$2.17. Maximum changes in aquifer levels for the study area are found to
be 40 feet (Figure 4.2). With the same assumptions, the cost of applying
an acre-inch of groundwater at the depth of 90 feet is estimated to be $2.77.
Assuming that changes in the cost of pumping does not significantly affect
irrigation decisions, the increase in cost of applying 16 inches of groundwater
per acre is $9.6. This estimate is the effect of changes in aquifer levels
on expected profit through their effect on pumping cost. Compared to the
range of changes in expected profit due to changes in instantaneous supply
of groundwater ($20 to $100), this value shows a much smaller effect as a
result of aquifer depletion. The effect from increase in pumping cost is 50%
smaller than those from decrease in instantaneous supply of groundwater
when aquifer levels are high. At lower aquifer levels, the effect is an order
of magnitude lower. This finding specifically highlights the importance of
considering the changes in instantaneous supply of groundwater at lower
saturated thicknesses.
When studying changes in buffer value, it is important to consider that
declines in well capacity can result from aquifer depletion, or low initial satu-
rated thickness levels. The latter is especially important due to the nonlinear
nature of the relationship between saturated thickness and well capacity such
that at lower saturated thicknesses, a one foot change in saturated thickness
can result in a much larger effect in well capacity than at higher saturated
thicknesses. Furthermore, it is important to notice that profit will signifi-
cantly decrease for an expected profit-maximizing farmer as a result of a one
unit decline in well capacity when well capacity is low (figure 3.2). Com-
paring Figures 4.2 and 4.4 we can see this point. These figures show that
the most significant changes have taken place at the border of Nebraska and
Kansas where there has not been significant reduction in aquifer levels and
the decline in buffer value of the aquifer is a result of lower initial satu-
rated thickness levels. Lower initial saturated thickness could be the result
of aquifer depletion pre-1980, or of less availability of groundwater in the
region due to local physical aquifer characteristics. We can also see from
Figures 4.2 and 4.4 that in the southwestern part of the study area, the re-
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duction in buffer value of the aquifer has resulted from both low saturated
thickness levels and significant aquifer depletion.
Scanlon et al. (2012) show that changes in aquifer storage is very localized
within the High Plains Aquifer. We further show that changes in buffer
value of the aquifer are also very localized so that we observe significant
differences in change of buffer value even within a county. The results of
this study, however, show a stark contrast to studies that merely focus on
changes in aquifer levels such as Scanlon et al. (2012). This difference is
due to the fact that changes in buffer value of the aquifer are a function
of initial saturated thickness and changes in saturated thickness over time.
We show that changes in well capacity are not a linear function of saturated
thickness. Also, well capacity changes differently with different underlying
aquifer characteristics (in this case, specific yield) as saturated thickness
changes. Furthermore, there is more to production risk than changes in well
capacity. The same amount of reduction in well capacity in two different
counties may result in different changes in production risk due to differences
in production function. I have captured the effects of differences in county
characteristics on production in a production function that is calibrated to
long run crop yields in each county. Considering all these factors, we find
that changes in buffer value need not necessarily align well with changes in
aquifer levels.
4.5 Discussion
When studying the effects of aquifer depletion and the role of aquifer man-
agement, it is critical to understand the type of services and functions an
aquifer provides. These services depend on the nature of the activity, how
income depends on the aquifer, and how it is affected by changes in aquifer
levels. Most existing studies have focused on the seasonal benefits of aquifers
for irrigated agriculture (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Provencher and Burt,
1994; Knapp and Olson, 1995), or the lifespan of the aquifer (Scanlon et al.,
2012; Steward et al., 2013) assuming that existence of the aquifer is enough
for providing protection against changes in weather conditions. These stud-
ies ignore the stylized facts regarding the effects of aquifer depletion on the
capacity of the aquifer to provide instantaneous groundwater supply to buffer
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against dry weather conditions during the critical stages of the season, and
thus may provide results that are of little relevance to policy. Since one of
the main roles of a groundwater aquifer is to provide a reliable source of sup-
ply to supplement scarce precipitation during a growing season and to insure
against dry weather conditions, it is important to understand the effect of
aquifer depletion on production risk for irrigated agriculture.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in understanding the
effects of declining aquifer levels on irrigated agriculture. Our results sug-
gest that focusing on changes in saturated thickness does not provide the full
picture. We need to take into account the channels through which aquifer
depletion affects irrigated agriculture both for understanding the effects of
previous aquifer depletion and effects future extraction rates. Taking pro-
duction risk into account can be specifically important for understanding
the response of farmers to future declines in aquifer levels and for providing
effective policy recommendations.
There is a strong consensus among economists that at current prices, there
is little response from farmers to changes in aquifer levels from increasing
pumping costs. Results of this study suggest that focusing solely on the costs
of pumping may significantly underestimate the negative effects of aquifer
depletion. Increasing production risk is a major effect that has been widely
understudied by economists and deserves more attention. Furthermore, a
widely held belief among many economists is that irrigation can offset the
impacts of weather variations. However, the ability of the aquifer to buffer
for these variations is limited and as aquifer levels decline, this ability may
further decrease. A decline in the instantaneous supply of groundwater could
result in significant increases in production risk.
This study can also contribute to the literature in understand the value
of natural capital by taking into account the channels through which indi-
viduals interact with aquifer and the nonlinearilities in physical characteris-
tics. For example, in studying the value of groundwater as natural capital,
Fenichel et al. (2016) analyze the role value lost due to aquifer depletion in the
Kansas portion of the High Plains Aquifer. They include a dummy variable
for aquifer levels below 29.5 feet to capture the effects of lower pump rates
on water consumption. However, this does not capture nonlinear changes
in pump rates due to changes in aquifer levels and may underestimate the
effects.
92
Results of the current study can also have significant implications for the
interaction of aquifer depletion and climatic changes. The results suggest that
declining aquifer levels can result in larger production risk as a result of lower
ability to buffer against dry weather conditions during the critical stages of
the growing season. Climate change is expected to change the distribution
of seasonal and intra-seasonal weather variables resulting in more weather
variation during a growing season and more frequent dry years. Under these
conditions, the importance of groundwater aquifers is expected to increase.
It is important to consider loss of buffer value when considering management
policies (Taylor et al., 2013).
Finally, it is important to study the loss of buffer value for the entire
High Plains Aquifer. The study area in this chapter has experienced smaller
changes in saturated thickness compared to areas in Texas and southwest
Kansas. Furthermore, there is more variation in the underlying aquifer char-
acteristics, weather conditions and production function characteristics over
the entire aquifer. Thus, studying the entire aquifer will provide a more com-
plete picture of the effects of aquifer depletion on buffer value of the aquifer.
Future research can further extend the methods provided in this study to
better capture the effect of aquifer depletion on production risk in irrigated
agriculture.
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4.6 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Distribution of maximum irrigated yield across counties
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Ratio of maximum 5 0.995 0.017 0.97 1.01
irrigated yield
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Table 4.2: Effect of saturated thickness on well capacity
Pump rate
log(saturated thickness) 74.588∗∗∗
(1.562)
Specific yield 7.011∗∗∗
(0.348)
Constant 406.783∗∗∗
(10.917)
Year dummies? Yes
Observations 43,981
R2 0.098
Adjusted R2 0.097
Residual Std. Error 303.114 (df = 43942)
F Statistic 125.890∗∗∗ (df = 38; 43942)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.3: Loss of buffer value for the study area
Variable Chase Perkins Dundy Sherman Cheyenne
Irrigated acresa 131, 100 110, 522 64, 188 59, 412 24, 842
Total annual loss 3.28 2.73 1.93 1.82 0.83
(Million $)
Annual loss 25 24.7 30.1 30.6 33.5
per acre ($)
Irrigated land 172 137 126 124 111
rent ($)
a Irrigated acres for each county is the average between 2001 and 2009.
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Figure 4.1: Map of the 5 counties studied. The upper 3 counties are
Perkins, Chase and Dundy in Nebraska and bottom 2 counties are
Cheyenne and Sherman in Kansas.
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Predicted
 changes in
 well capacity
(−110,−90](−130,−110](−150,−130](−170,−150](−190,−170](−210,−190](−230,−210]
Figure 4.3: Predicted changes in well capacity in gallons per minute as a
result of changes in saturated thickness in the study area between 1980 and
2009.
99
Annual Loss of 
 buffer value 
 per acre
$20 to $30$30 to $40$40 to $50$50 to $60$60 to $70$70 to $80$80 to $90$90 to $100
Figure 4.4: Loss of buffer value in the study area in dollars per acre.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I address the role of two important factors in water
management policies in agriculture including limitations imposed by insti-
tutional settings (Chapter 2) and limitations imposed by physical aquifer
characteristics (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). I study these factors by explic-
itly considering the channels through which physical characteristics affect
individual decisions and by studying the incentives that specific institutional
settings provide for individuals. I show that the studied limitations can have
a significant role in the effectiveness and distributional effects of policies and
can affect the choice of policies intended to reduce extraction of resources.
In Chapter 2, in an empirical study and using a geocoded dataset that
includes parcel specific characteristics, I studied whether a groundwater mar-
ket with ratio trading system provides incentives for individuals to move the
resource away from a surface body, namely the Platte River. The results
provide evidence regarding the incentives that the market provides for mov-
ing groundwater extraction away from the river and reducing extraction over
time in practice. I show that while the market provides incentives for sellers
to sell their property rights in the direction intended by planners, it does not
provide similar incentives for buyers. I suggest that one reason might be the
presence of search costs in the market. I further study the presence of search
costs in the market, which is local and informal, and find significant evidence
that search costs are, in fact, significant and affect those with smaller quan-
tities to trade and smaller SDF more significantly. I find the upper bound
of loss of efficiency due to search frictions in the intensive margin of trade to
be 39 percent of price of a groundwater permit. These results can provide
some insight in design of permit markets at local level where the markets
are informal. The results of this chapter suggest that while a trading ratio
can potentially be an effective tool for moving the resources in a direction to
reduce externality or reduce resource extraction, the presence of transaction
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costs can affect the performance of the market.
In Chapter 3, I studied the effects of heterogeneity in physical aquifer
characteristics among individual farmers in terms of instantaneous supply of
groundwater on farmers’ irrigation decisions on the extensive and intensive
margins. I show that well capacity affects a profit maximizing farmer’s irriga-
tion decisions nonlinearly such there exists a specific well capacity that those
with lower well capacities adjust their irrigated acres to be able to buffer
for variations in weather during the critical stages of the growing season.
This nonlinearity has some major implications. First this finding suggests
that responses to changes in price and precipitation may not be monotonic
among individuals. Specifically, farmers with an intermediate range of well
capacities may be the ones that are most responsive to changes in price and
precipitation. Finally, I use the analytical results to study cost-effectiveness
and distributional effects of four uniform second best policies in the Up-
per Republican Natural Resources District in Nebraska. I find that while a
pumping tax can be the cost-effective second best policy, an acreage tax may
provide better incentives for managing local aquifer depletion. This finding
suggests that cost-effectiveness may not be the only factor policy makers
would want to take into account when dealing with local aquifer depletion.
While one might think that a pumping tax could be the best policy, an
acreage tax can provide better incentives for farmers in parts of the aquifer
with low well capacities to reduce their extraction. The results of this chapter
show that considering the effects of heterogeneity in physical characteristics
is very important for understanding the effectiveness of different policies.
The analytical results in Chapter 3 show that the effect of access to instan-
taneous groundwater supply on irrigation decisions and profits is nonlinear.
This finding suggests that the effect of aquifer depletion on irrigated agri-
culture may be more significant than previously realized, especially if we
consider changing climatic conditions and the role of aquifers in buffering
against intra-seasonal weather variations. In Chapter 4, I study this issue
using a numerical model for a part of the northern High Plains Aquifer. I
find that aquifer depletion can result in a decrease in the buffer value of the
aquifer which has not been considered before. Furthermore, I find that the
effects of aquifer depletion on buffer value of the aquifer can vary significantly
even within the scale of a county and can also depend on initial saturated
thickness and local characteristics of the aquifer.
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Combining results of Chapters 3 and 4 provides some insight into local
management of groundwater aquifers. The results of Chapter 4 suggest that
loss of buffer value is very localized and while parts of a county can expe-
rience small changes in buffer value, some other parts of the same county
can experience much larger declines in their buffer value. As a result, local
aquifer management should consider this heterogeneity within the manage-
ment area. The results of Chapter 3 suggest that when low well capacities
within portions of the aquifer are a major concern, an acreage tax may be
preferred over other policies. Put together, these results can provide support
for local level aquifer management as opposed to state level management.
This might be of interest as in many cases policy makers are favoring local
management areas. For example California is adopting Sustainable Ground-
water Management Act (SGMA) to “provide a buffer against drought and
climate change”1.
Overall, this dissertation provides some insight into local management of
natural resources. First, I show that when establishing a market to reallocate
resources, adopting trading ratios based on transfer coefficient can be suc-
cessful. However, search costs need to be taken into account. Search friction
is something that may be present in many permit markets and policy makers
should facilitate provision of information to potential buyers and sellers. Sec-
ond, I show that considering heterogeneity in physical characteristics can be
very important in choosing between alternative second best policies such as
taxes and quotas. Finally, I show that in order to develop effective policies,
we need to take into account the channels through which natural resource
availability and its underlying characteristics affect decisions of individuals.
Merely focusing on trends over time does not provide a picture that is of
relevance to policy.
1http://groundwater.ca.gov
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 2
A.1 Effects of Parcel Specific Characteristics, Prices
and Precipitation on Profit Differential
Caswell and Zilberman (1986) introduced a framework to study the effects of
well depth and soil quality on irrigation technology adoption decision. They
study conditions under which a profit maximizing farmer would choose to use
modern irrigation technologies over traditional technologies. This part builds
on their study and tries to explain how physical and spatial characteristics
affect farmers’ profit differential and thus their reservation price. This section
assumes that water rights are defined per acre1.
Let water use efficiency, hi(µ), be a fraction of precipitation plus water
applied to the land that is utilized by crop. let land quality, µ, be water
use efficiency of the soil under no irrigation. Let i = 0 denote dryland and
i = 1 be irrigated agriculture. Thus by definition h0(µ) = µ and h1(µ) > µ
for µ ∈ (0, 1) because of land quality augmenting characteristic of irrigation.
Let h
′
1(µ) > 0 and h
′′
1(µ) < 0 so that irrigation increases land quality more
for lower quality soils. At µ = 1, h1(µ) = µ = 1.
Let the per acre cost of irrigation for irrigated land be cost of pumping
water and fixed costs of irrigation plus operating the land. I assume that the
fixed costs are independent of the amount of water applied. Pumping cost is
assumed to be a linear function of applied water. For dryland farming, costs
are composed of only fixed operation costs and it is assumed that the fixed
1In practice groundwater permits are defined in one of the two ways: assigning permits
to the unit of volume of water extracted; or attaching them to the acres of land. In the
former method pumps are metered while in the latter acres are monitored but there are
no restrictions on the amount pumped from any certified acre. This study uses the latter
to be consistent with the definition of permits in the study area.
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costs of irrigating are higher than fixed costs of not irrigating2. With this
definition, costs of irrigated and dryland agriculture are:
C1(.) = peeγx(.) +K1 (A.1)
C0(.) = K0 (A.2)
where pe is the price of energy, e is the amount of energy needed to lift
one unit of water one unit of depth, γ is the depth to water and x(.) is the
amount of water pumped (and applied) to the land. As mentioned K1 > K0.
Production function is defined as a concave function and is assumed to be
the same for dryland and irrigated agriculture:
f 1(.) = f(e1) = f
(
Zh0(µ) + x(.)h1(µ)
)
(A.3)
f 0(.) = f(e0) = f
(
Zh0(µ)
)
(A.4)
where Z is the average amount of precipitation. e0 and e1 are effective water,
i.e. the amount of water utilized by crop in dryland and irrigated agriculture
respectively. Notice that irrigation does not augment the quality of soil in
utilizing precipitation. From equations (A.1) to (A.4) we can get the per
acre profit functions:
Max pi1(.) = Pf
(
Zh0(µ) + x(.)h1(µ)
)− peeγx(.)−K1 (A.5)
Max pi0(.) = Pf
(
Zh0(µ)
)−K0. (A.6)
Since the rights are defined on the acres of land being irrigated we can find
the optimal per acre amount of applied water by maximizing per acre profits:
Maximize
x(.)
Pf
(
Zh0(µ) + x(.)h1(µ)
)− peeγx(.)−K1 (A.7)
2Based on crop budgets from University of Nebraska, Lincoln extension total per acre
costs for dryland getting 125 bushels actual yield per acre of corn are $444.87, while total
per acre costs for center pivot irrigation getting 225 bushels actual yield per acre of corn is
$944.88. Total cost of pumping is estimated to be $104.31. Thus fixed costs of irrigation
(in the sense defined in this study) are much higher than those of dryland.
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The first order conditions are:
Ph1(µ)f
′
(Zh0(µ) + x(.)h1(µ))− peeγ = 0 (A.8)
Or Pf
′(
Zh0(µ) + x(.)h1(µ)
)
=
peeγ
h1(µ)
(A.9)
Equation (A.8) shows that there is a specific level of applied water per acre
x∗(P, pe, µ, γ, Z, e) that maximizes per acre profits of irrigation and equation
(A.9) shows that the value marginal product (VMP) of effective water is
equal to price of effective water. An increase in price of effective water
would result in a decrease in amount of water applied, x(.). Since irrigation
increases both revenues and costs, the question is under what conditions
profit of irrigation is bigger than dryland farming. The comparative statics
are derived to explain the effect of parcel specific characteristics (well depth
and land quality), market forces (prices of diesel and output), and climatic
conditions (precipitation) on profit differential.
Well depth only affects profit of irrigated agriculture. Taking the derivative
of pi1 with respect to γ we have:
∂pi1(.)
∂γ
=
[
Pf
′
h1(µ)− peeγ
]∂x(.)
∂γ
− peex(.) = −peex(.) (A.10)
where the term in brackets is zero from the envelop theorem. Equation
(A.10) shows that as well depth increases, irrigation cost increases and profit
of irrigation decreases. When well depth is zero, γ = 0, profits of irrigated
agriculture is greater than profits of dryland agriculture, ∆pi > 0, but as
depth of well increases costs of irrigation go up, decreasing the profit dif-
ferential between irrigated and dryland agriculture until at one specific well
depth profits are equal. After this point irrigation does not make economic
sense and the farmer sells the irrigation rights. Since at lower depths profit
differential is higher we expect the farmers with lower depths to be less likely
to sell and more likely to buy the rights.
Land quality increases profits of both irrigated and dryland agriculture.
Since irrigation increases water use efficiency at a decreasing rate we expect
that at a specific land quality profit differential is maximum. Taking the
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derivative of ∆pi with respect to µ we have:
∂∆pi(.)
∂µ
= P.
{
f
′(
Zµ+ h1x(.)
)[
Z + x(.)h
′
1
]− f ′(Zµ)Z}. (A.11)
For low land qualities, h1(µ) is low and h
′
1(µ) is high. Since price of effective
water is high for low land qualities, their marginal value product is high and
thus
∂∆Π
∂µ
> 0 i.e. profit differential decreases as soil quality decreases. For
high land qualities, h1(µ) is high (it is equal to 1 at the maximum point)
and h
′
1(µ) is low (it is equal to zero when h1(µ) = 1). This means price of
effective water is low and thus VMP of irrigation is low. For very high soil
qualities
∂∆Π
∂µ
< 0, i.e. as soil quality increases profit differential decreases.
There is a soil quality, µ∗, between highest and lowest soil qualities that has
the maximum profit differential. Farmers with low and high quality soils are
most likely to sell while farmers with medium quality soils are least likely to
sell. On the other hand, buyers with medium soil quality are most likely to
buy and those with high and low soil qualities are least likely to buy.
Since price of output only affects the revenues and because the output
of irrigated agriculture is always higher than dryland agriculture we would
expect a higher price of output to increase the profit differential. On the
other hand an increase in price of fuel only increases costs of irrigation and
reduces the profit differential:
∂∆pi(.)
∂P
= f
(
Zµ+ h1x(.)
)− f(Zµ) (A.12)
∂∆pi(.)
∂pe
= −eγx(.). (A.13)
For any positive amount of applied water
∂∆pi
∂P
is positive and
∂∆pi
∂pe
is neg-
ative, i.e. as price of output goes up or price of energy goes down the profit
differential for every soil quality of sellers and buyers goes up. Finally to see
the effects of changes in average precipitation, Z, on the profit differential
the partial derivative with respect to Z is taken:
∂∆pi(.)
∂Z
=
[
Pf
′(
Zµ+ h1x(.)
)− Pf ′(Zµ)]µ. (A.14)
The optimal amount of effective water for irrigated agriculture does not de-
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pend on precipitation. Thus for a given soil quality two cases can happen:
if the amount of precipitation is low, VMP of irrigation is higher than VMP
of dryland and an increase in precipitation increases profit differential; if the
amount of precipitation is high then VMP of irrigation is lower than VMP
of dryland and as precipitation increases profit differential decreases.
Prices and precipitation have a direct and an indirect effect on partici-
pation: they directly affect reservation prices through profit differential and
indirectly affect reservation prices by affecting the reservation price of the
other side of the market. As argued earlier mathematically the effect is am-
biguous but labor market literature suggest that the effect of other side’s
participation is significant on one’s trading activity.
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proofs
Proposition 1. As X →∞, G(X
A
, )→ 1 and h(X)→∞ so the total water
availability constraint does not bind and the objective function becomes:
A
{
Φ(u, µ+ , σ)− Γ(Y )u
}
(B.1)
which is linear in the proportion of acres irrigated. At any positive u
where profits per acre are positive, A = 1. When A = 1 objective function
is concave in u over [µ + ,∞), which means there exists a unique solution,
u∗∞ for the first order conditions:
Φ′(u∗∞, µ+ , σ) = Γ(Y ) (B.2)
We can see that as marginal cost, Γ(Y ), increases, u∗∞ decreases.
Proposition 2. Assume that there exists a Xc large enough so that A = 1
constraint still binds. Two sets of equations explain the case where X > Xc:
λ2 =
{
G(
X
A
, )− (X
A
)G′(
X
A
, )
}
Φ(u, µ, , σ)− Γ(Y )u (B.3)
and
G(
X
A
, )Φ′(u, µ+ , σ)− Γ(Y ) = 0 (B.4)
From equation B.3, we can see that at infinity λ2 is positive, which means
A = 1 is binding and with large enough Xc, λ2 will still be greater than zero.
From equation B.4 we can see that as well capacity decreases, optimal water
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application rate decreases at the rate:
∂u
∂X
= −G
′(X
A
, )Φ′(u, µ+ , σ)
G(X
A
, )Φ′′(u, µ+ , σ)
> 0 (B.5)
along the concave region of the production function. This is because a
change in well capacity affects the marginal profit of adding an inch, i.e. as
well capacity decreases the marginal benefit of adding an inch decreases.
Proposition 3. To see how a decrease in well capacity affects shadow
value of adding an acre, we take the derivative of equation B.3 with respect
to X:
∂λ2
∂X
= −(X
A
)G′′(
X
A
, )Φ(u, µ, , σ)
+
{
G(
X
A
, )− (X
A
)G′(
X
A
, )
}
Φ′(u, µ, , σ)
∂u
∂X
− Γ(Y ) ∂u
∂X
(B.6)
where the first term is the effect of a change in well capacity on shadow
value of adding an acre keeping the amount of water applied fixed, i.e. the
effect only through a change in productivity due to instantaneous groundwa-
ter availability. The second term is the effect of a change in water application
from a marginal change in well capacity (intensive margin adjustment), and
the last term is the change in per acre cost of applying water. Again, we can
see that as X →∞, ∂u
∂X
→ 0 and ∂λ2
∂X
> 0. All three terms in equation B.6
are positive which means that as well capacity decreases both marginal bene-
fit of adding an acre and marginal cost of adding an acre decrease. However,
we know that eventually marginal benefit decreases at a much faster rate due
to the concavity of production function while marginal cost decreases at a
fixed rate. Thus, there exists a well capacity, Xs, where A = 1 does not bind
anymore. This well capacity is the intersection of the two hyperplanes with
λ2 = 0 and A = 1. We call this point the switching point, and it is defined
by the following equations:{
G(Xs, )− (Xs)G′(Xs, )
}
Φ(u, µ, , σ)− Γ(Y )u = 0 (B.7)
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and
G(Xs, )Φ
′(u, µ+ , σ)− Γ(Y ) = 0. (B.8)
Equation B.8 provides a unique u∗ for any X at A = 1. Replacing u∗ into
equation B.7 we get a unique Xs(Y, , µ, σ). To see the change in optimal
irrigation decision for well capacities below Xs we first need to assume that
the second derivative of G(X, )Φ(u, µ+ , σ) with respect to both A and u is
negative, and the Hessian is negative definite. This assumption provides the
unique solution to the profit maximization. We then take partial derivative
of both equations in 3.3 under the condition of λ1 = λ2 = 0. Differentiating
the first equation of 3.3 we get:
− (X
A
)(
A−XA′
A2
)G′′(
X
A
, )Φ(u, µ, , σ)
+
〈{
G(
X
A
, )− (X
A
)G′(
X
A
, )
}
Φ′(u, µ, , σ)− Γ(Y )
〉
u′ = 0
(B.9)
where A′ = ∂A/∂X and u′ = ∂u/∂X. From the second equation in 3.3 we
get:
A′
{
G(
X
A
, )Φ(u, µ, , σ)− Γ(Y )
}
+
(
A−XA′
A2
)G′(
X
A
, )Φ′(u, µ, , σ)+
AG(
X
A
, )Φ′′(u, µ, , σ)u′ = 0
(B.10)
The first term in B.10 is zero from first order conditions while the second
and third terms are both positive. There are two possible cases. First, if
∂u/∂X = 0 and ∂A/∂X = A/X; second, if A − XA′ < 0. In either case,
the solution to equation B.10 should solve equation B.9. We can see from
equation B.9 that only the first scenario can provide a solution to equation
B.9. suggesting that when well yield is less than the switching point, the
number of acres irrigated decrease while per acre amount of water applied
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stays the same. Notice that:
∂A
∂X
=
A
X
→ EXA = ∂A/A
∂X/X
= 1 (B.11)
Where EXA can be defined as elasticity of irrigated acres as well capacity
changes by 1 percent. This elasticity is fixed for well capacities below Xs
suggesting that changes in well capacity translates into changes in irrigated
acres for well capacities below Xs.
Proposition 4. Part (a) of the proposition is directly obtained from
previous propositions and does not require a proof. The proof of part (b)
is straight forward. If sensitivity to daily water availability is held constant,
the problem reduces to:
Max
A,u
A
{
GˆΦ(u, µ+ , σ)− Γ(Y )u
}
subject to Au ≤ h(X)
A ≤ 1
A, u ≥ 0
(B.12)
As well capacity decreases, at some well capacity Au = h(X) below which
the farmer adjusts the intensive margin first until the point where shadow
price of adding an acre becomes zero. At that point the profit maximizing
decision is to keep the amount of water applied fixed and decrease irrigated
acres. This switching point is a result of seasonal water availability.
Proposition 5. In order to prove this proposition we first show that as
sensitivity to daily water availability increases switching point well capacity,
Xs, increases, while, u
∗
∞ and u
∗
min do not change. It is clear from proposition
1 that as well capacity reaches infinity, sensitivity to daily water availability
does not affect irrigation decisions, i.e. u∗∞ is the same for any sensitivity
at infinity. Rewriting equation 3.3 for two crops, i and j, with the same
seasonal production function but different sensitivity to instantaneous water
availability we get:
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{
Gi(
X
Ai
, )− (X
Ai
)G′i(
X
Ai
, )
}
Φ(ui, µ+ , σ)
ui
={
Gj(
X
Aj
, )− (X
Aj
)G′j(
X
Aj
, )
}
Φ(uj, µ+ , σ)
uj
=
Gi(
X
Ai
, )Φ′(ui, µ+ , σ) = Gj(
X
Aj
, )Φ′(uj, µ+ , σ) = Γ(Y )
(B.13)
from equation B.13, ui = uj = u
∗
min. Since u
∗
min is the same for all the
crops with the same seasonal production function, at the switching point,
where A = 1, we must have Gi(Xsi) = Gj(Xsj). Since crop j is more sensi-
tive to daily water availability, Xsj > Xsi. This result shows that as the crop
becomes more sensitive to daily water availability, a farmer switches earlier
to keep the maximum daily water availability per acre at a higher rate so that
she can meet the demand during critical days of the season. However, the
seasonal amount of water applied below the switching point is the same for
both crops. In a sense, the farmer applies more water during peak demand
days for the more sensitive crop but total seasonal water application is the
same for both crops. This result also suggests that as sensitivity to daily
water availability increases, the error the previous models produce in ex-
plaining irrigation decisions increases. From this result, proving proposition
5 becomes straight forward. Define X¯ such that h(X¯) = u∗min. There exists
a sensitivity to daily water availability, G¯, where switching point takes place
at the point (X¯, h(X¯)). For any crop less sensitive to daily water availability
than G¯ total seasonal water availability constraint binds.
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B.2 Comparative Statics
Comparative Statics 1. To see the effect of an increase in cost of pumping
on per acre application rate, we take the derivative of B.4 with respect to
Γ(Y ):
∂u
∂Γ(Y )
=
1
G(X, )Φ′′(u, µ+ , σ)
< 0 (B.14)
and similarly for
∂X˜
∂Γ(Y )
, we have:
∂X˜
∂Γ(Y )
=
{[
G(X˜, )− (X˜)G′(X˜, )
]
Φ′(u, µ, , σ)− Γ(Y )
}
∂u
∂Γ(Y )
− u
(X˜)G′′(X˜, )Φ(u, µ, , σ)
(B.15)
since
∂u
∂Γ(Y )
is small, the numerator is negative. Since the denominator
is also negative,
∂X˜
∂Γ(Y )
is positive meaning as cost of pumping increases
switching point increases.
Comparative Statics 2. We first show the effect of a drier weather on
profit-maximizing quantity of water applied per acre. As before, we take the
derivative of B.4 with respect to :
∂u
∂
= −G(X, )
∂Φ′(u,µ+,σ)
∂µ
+ ∂G(X,)
∂
Φ′(u, µ+ , σ)
G(X, )Φ′′(u, µ+ , σ)
(B.16)
where the first term in the numerator shows the effect of drier weather
on marginal benefit of adding a unit of water by increasing seasonal water
demand, while the second term shows the effect of drier weather on marginal
benefit of adding a unit of water through daily water availability. The first
term in the numerator of equation B.16 is positive showing that as weather
gets drier, marginal benefit of adding a unit of water over the season increases.
Second term in equation B.16 is negative suggesting that as weather gets
drier, marginal benefit of adding a unit of water can decrease. The intuition
is that, with limited well capacity a farmer is not able to meet the demand
during the critical stages of crop growth when water availability matters in
a dry year. As a result, applying more water after the peak demand, when
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the crop yield has already suffered, has less effect on yield than when the
demand is fully met. Obviously, we do not expect this effect to be significant
for high well capacities. We expect water application, u, to be dominated by
seasonal water demand. This is obvious from
∂G(X, )
∂
, which approaches
zero for large well capacities. However, as well capacity decreases,
∂G(X, )
∂
decreases (because its negative) and
∂u
∂
becomes negative suggesting profit-
maximizing quantity of groundwater applied can increase in a wet year for
lower well capacities. This result suggests that while a profit-maximizing
farmer with high well capacities applies more water per acre in a dry year,
with lower well capacities, she might apply less groundwater per acre in a
dry year. This is provided in figure B.1 which shows irrigation depth for
a wet year and a dry year compared to the average year for different well
capacities.
In order to see the effect of a drier year on the switching point, we look at
the effect of a change in  on shadow value of adding an acre, equation B.3,
when A = 1:
∂λ2
∂
=
{
∂G(X, )
∂
−X∂G
′(X, )
∂
}
Φ(u, µ, , σ)+{{
G(X, )−XG′(X, )
}
Φ′(u, µ, , σ)− Γ(Y )
}
∂u
∂
+{
G(X, )−XG′(X, )
}
∂Φ(u, µ, , σ)
∂µ
(B.17)
The first term is the effect of a drier weather on marginal benefit of adding
an acre through daily water availability, and it is negative for two reasons.
First, as the weather gets drier, keeping the amount of water applied and
maximum daily application rate fixed, crop yield will decrease. Second,
adding an acre results in lower maximum daily application rate per acre.
As weather gets drier, the effect of lower maximum daily water available on
crop yield becomes more significant. These two effects together mean that as
weather gets drier, shadow value of adding an acre decreases due to inability
to meet daily crop water demand. The second term in equation B.17 is the
effect of seasonal water demand in a drier on shadow value value of adding an
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acre. As we saw, seasonal water demand increases for high well capacities and
decreases for low well capacities. Thus for high well capacities, shadow value
of adding an acre decreases and for low well capacities, it increases. Finally,
the last term, shows the effect of a drier weather keeping seasonal application
and maximum daily application rate fixed. Keeping everything fixed, in a
drier year, shadow value of adding an acre is lower and the last term is neg-
ative. For high well capacities, all three terms are negative, suggesting that
shadow value of adding an acre decreases for any high well capacity. As well
capacity becomes smaller, the second term becomes positive. However, its
effect is dominated by effect of maximum daily groundwater availability (first
term). Thus under all conditions, shadow value of adding an acre decreases,
suggesting that under a drier weather the farmer switches at a higher well
capacity.
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Figure B.1: Effect of climatic conditions on irrigation depth.
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